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INTRODUCTION

C

limate change, international terrorism, the spread of communicable diseases, and other similar problems affect the
lives of everybody all over the world. Ideally, states and other
political institutions of jurisdiction1 would cooperate to solve
them, and quickly. Despite their urgency, however, multilateral
efforts in a number of these areas have progressed too slowly, if
at all. Even where progress is made, all it takes to undo it is for
one or two important players to pull out.2 In this context, some
states have unilaterally taken measures to regulate activities
outside their territory. Well-known examples include the ban enacted by the United States against imports of shrimp caught in

1. The category oL 9political institutions of jurisdiction8 contains just one
example, the European Union. The European Union is not a sovereign state
but exercises direct jurisdiction over individuals nonetheless. The difficult issues of democratic legitimacy that this raises cannot be examined here. For the
purposes of this article, it shall be treated in the manner of a defective federal
state.
2. As this article was being prepared, President Trump announced the
withdrawal of the United States from the Paris Climate Accord, an agreement
on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions that had been hailed as the best
opportunity for averting catastrophic climate change and which had been
signed by 195 countries. Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From
Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), at A1.
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the high seas using nets that tended to snare endangered turtles,3 and the European 7nion’s E/issions Trading fireQtive,
which required all aircraft landing or taking off from EU to offset
their carbon emissions, regardless of nationality or place of emission.4 Such measures are by no means the preserve of large economic and military powers. In 2014, the island republic of Singapore unilaterally legislated to create civil and criminal liability for any corporation engaged in massive burning of forests in
neighboring Indonesia of the type that tended to cause widespread air pollution in Singapore.5 Along with Australia, Cape
Verde, Angola, and South Africa, Singapore has also enacted
data protection laws applying to organizations even if not physically located in the country.6
The international legality of these measures is a matter of
heated controversy.7 As shown in Part I, however, a number of
3. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101N162, §609 (103
Stat.) 988, 1037N38 (codified at Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), 16
U.S.C. §1537 (1994)).
4. Council Directive 2008/101, 2008 O.J. (L 8) 3 (EC) (amending Council
Directive 2003/87, 2009 O.J. (L 8) 3 (EC)) [hereinafter EU Emissions Trading
Directive].
5. Transboundary Haze Pollution Act, No. 24 (2014), §§ 4N8 (Sing.). For
useful readings, see Mahdev Mohan, A Domestic Solution for Transboundary
Harm: Singapore’s Haze Pollution Law, 2 BUS. & HUM. RTS J. 325 (2017).
6. Personal Data Protection Act, No. 26 (2012), (Sing.). See Sheena Jacob
& Jinesh Lalwani, Personal Data Protection law is enacted in Singapore, BIRD
& BIRD (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www.twobirds.com/en/news/articles/2010/personal-data-protection-law-is-enacted-in-singapore-1012; Dan B. Svantesson,
The Extraterritoriality of EU Data Privacy Law—Its Theoretical Justification
and Its Practical Effect on U.S. Businesses, 50 STAN. J. INT’L L. 53, 88N89
(2014).
7. Both the U.S. and EU measures mentioned in notes 3 and 4 were ultimately scuppered. The United States’ prohibition on the importation of shrimp
was held to be incompatible with the United :tates’ obligations under the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT) in Appellate Body Report, United
States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (adopted Oct. 12, 1998). The legality of the EU Emissions
Trading Directive was challenged before the Court of Justice of the European
Union (CJEU), but upheld in Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of
America v. Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R. I2735. Following the decision, twenty-three countries threatened retaliation including international litigation and review or cancellation of air transport service agreements. The European Union subsequently shelved emissions offsetting requirements on international flights, and now only imposes them on
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prominent scholars defend them using the concept and terminology oL 9publiQ goods8 borrowed Lro/ the economic sciences.8 On
this view, environmental protection, the prevention of terrorism,
competitive markets, and many other things are designated as
9global publiQ goods,8 on the basis that they enhanQe utility Lor
all,9 but tend to be 9undersupplied8 due to certain structural features of nonrivalrousness and nonexcludablility, which in turn
leaves particular individuals and states with no incentive to supply the/ but instead to 9Lree ride8 on the eLLorts oL othersZ10
Such accounts begin from what this article Qalls the 9liberal8
premise that the fundamental concern of law is with the wellbeing of individual human beings. They generally argue that
unilateral measures asserting extraterritorial jurisdiction are
justified on grounds that they provide certain kinds of utilityK

flights within the European Economic Area. See European Commission, Reducing
emissions
from
aviation,
http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/transport/aviation/index_en.htm (last visited July 29, 2016).
8. See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV.
ECON. STAT. 387, 387N89 (1954); MANCUR OLSON, LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965).
9. See, e.g., Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc A. Stern, Defining Global
Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN THE
21ST CENTURY 2, 2N9 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg, & Marc A. Stern eds.,
1999); Daniel Bodansky, What’s in a Concept? Global Public Goods, International Law, and Legitimacy, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 651, 652N53 (2012); Fabrizio
Cafaggi, Transnational Private Regulation and the Production of Global Public
Goods and Private “Bads,” 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 695, 695N96 (2012); Petros C.
Mavroidis, Free Lunches? WTO as Public Good, and the WTO’s View of Public
Goods, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 731, 731 (2012) (mentioning that he 9assumes the
commonplace definition8 suggests that there may be others); Elisa Morgera,
Bilateralism at the Service of Community Interests? Non-Judicial Enforcement
of Global Public Goods in the Context of Global Environmental Law, 23 EUR. J.
INT’L L. 743, 748 (2012); Nico Krisch, The Decay of Consent: International Law
in an Age of Global Public Goods, 108 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 3 (2014) (defining public
goods as 9goods that are non-excludable and non-rivalrous in their consumption. . . .8).
10. See Inge Kaul, Global Public Goods: Explaining their Underprovision,
15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 729, 730N36 (2012); Gregory Shaffer, International Law
and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 669,
674 (2012) (arguing that the 9major challenge for the production of many (but
not all) global public goods . . . is collective action and free-riding.8); Krisch,
supra note 9, at 3 (arguing that 9[m]ore than anything, using the label public
goods . . . points to the difficulties of maintaining adequate availability or production.8).
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9interests8 or 9values8Kthat would otherwise go undersupplied.11 Un Qontrast, this artiQle oLLers a 9republiQan8 aQQount,
whiQh proQeeds Lro/ the pre/ise that law’s Lunda/ental Qon[
cern is freedom, or the simple idea that no person is subject to
the will of another.12 In particular, the republicanism of this article is that of Immanuel Kant, especially as interpreted by Arthur Ripstein.13 In this vein, it proposes an understanding of
public goods in juridical terms as things that must be provided
publicly in order to ensure the equal freedom of all members of
the political community.14 From this, it ultimately follows that
states have the right to do anything necessary to provide their

11. See André Nollkaemper, International Adjudication of Global Public
Goods: The Intersection of Substance and Procedure, 23 EUR. J. INT’L L. 769,
775N77 (2012) (arguing that the legal scholarship on public goods divides
broadly into one group that defines that concept in terms of common or shared
values, whereas the other emphasizes their underenforcement); Kaul, supra
note 10, at 732N33 (distinguishing between 9[p]ublicness in utility and publicness in consumption8 and arguing that 9[i]n which way and to what extent a
public good, notably a [global public good], affects the welfare and well-being
of different population groups depends not only on the overall provision level
of the good but also on how it is shaped8); Morgera, supra note 9, at 746 (arguing that 9[c]ommon but differentiated responsibility encapsulates the need for
concerted action by all states to contribute to the 6general global welfare’ based
on mutual responsibility and solidarity as the basis for a sense of community
and global partnership.8).
12. For useful studies on the difference between liberal and republican conceptions of freedom, see QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM (1998)
(detailing the proliferation of 9neo-roman8 political theorists during the English Civil War and Revolution and their disappearance following the establishment of the protectorate and restoration); PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A
THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 17N50 (1997) (arguing that the prevalent mode of thinking about freedom in the Anglophone world was in republican terms of non-domination, until the nineteenth century, when the Hobbesian idea of freedom as non-interference was resurrected and popularized under
the influence of Jeremy Bentham).
13. IMMANUEL KANT, THE CAMBRIDGE EDITION OF THE WORKS OF IMMANUEL
KANT: PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY (Mary J. Gregor ed., 1999); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN,
FORCE AND FREEDOM: KANT’S LEGAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2009) [hereinafter RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom] Citations to the Doctrine of Right and the
Perpetual Peace are described with 9DR8 and 9PP8 respectively. As is custom,
references are made to the pagination of Kant’s collected works as compiled by
the Berlin-Brandenburg Akademie der Wissenschaften, as well as to Mary
Gregor’s translation.
14. See infra Part III, and RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at
ch. 8.
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subjects public goods, including asserting and enforcing jurisdiction extraterritorially over non-subjects. Moreover, they need
not first establish that they have suffered, or will suffer harm.
Part I of this article recounts a prominent liberal theory of unilateral jurisdiction to provide global public goodsKEyal Benvenisti’s pathbreaHing QonQept oL sovereigns as trustees oL hu/an[
ity.15 After identifying certain fundamental problems with this
concept, Part II then introduces the republican concept of human
dignity as freedom from being subject to the will of another. Such
a conception of dignity gives rise to three basic kinds of legal relations: tortious, contractual, and fiduciary. Torts divide into
two: wrongful damageKalways violations of property rights, and
wrongful useKalways violations of personality rights. Violations
of property rights require proof of damage, and are remedied by
compensation. For violations of personality rights, however,
damage is irrelevant, and the remedy is restitution.
Part III turns to public law and argues that none of these relations can be achieved as a matter of right in a condition of pure
private interactionKthe 9state oL natureZ8 Unstead, they re*uire
a Qo/bination oL politiQal institutions Hnown as the 9state,8
which wields public authority over its subjects. It is then argued
that the state is itself a person, and secondly, that it stands in
the relation of a fiduciary toward its subjects. As the public fiduciary, the state has obligations to provide public goods for all its
subjects. From this obligation to provide public goods, it derives
rights to enact measures to provide them, as well as rights
against all other persons who undermine this ability. Part IV
arrives at international law, and argues that as persons, the dignity of states also lies in not being subject to the will of another.
This then requires the establishment of political institutions at
the international levelZ This seQond, international 9rightLul Qon[
dition,8 however, diLLers Lro/ the Lirst, do/estiQ rightLul Qondi[
tion. One reason for this is that states have no property, only

15. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereigns as Trustees of Humanity: on the Accountability of States to Foreign Stakeholders, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2013) [hereinafter Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship]. Benvenisti developed the basic
themes of the article into a regulatory framework for global governance bodies
in his General Course at the Academy of International Law, The Hague, published as EYAL BENVENISTI, THE LAW OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2014) [hereinafter BENVENISTI, Global Governance].
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personality. Accordingly, all international wrongs are in fact violations of personality rights, where damage is irrelevant, and
the proper remedy is restitution.
Winally, Part 3 disQusses the proble/ oL 9global publiQ goodsZ8
The state’s purpose of providing public goods must not remain
unfulfilled due to lack of cooperation by other persons, state and
nonstate, but can be legislated for and executed unilaterally. InterLerenQes with the state’s ability to provide publiQ goods Qon[
stitute violations oL the state’s personality rights, and are wrong[
ful regardless of damage. The same principles governing the provision of public goods domestically also apply at the international level, as a result of which it must submit itself to an international judicial instance in order to answer legal challenges.
Lastly, where a state exercises authority over individual distant
strangers in the course of providing global public goods, it acquires human rights obligations towards them as a constructive
public fiduciary.
I. LIBERAL THEORIES: SOVEREIGN TRUSTEESHIP OF HUMANITY
A comprehensive treatment of the different liberal theories is
impossible within a single paper, so instead this article focuses
on one particularly rich and compelling variant thereof: Eyal
"envenisti’s QonQept oL 9sovereign trusteeship oL hu/anity,8
which constructs sovereign states as bearing fiduciary obligations not just toward their own citizens, but to all of humanity
in general. Benvenisti begins by noting the challenge posed by
globalization to traditional notions of international law, which
generally envision sovereign states as the highest sources of authority, and describe the binding force of international law as
deriving from their consent or convenience.16 The standard reason given for according states this paramount status is the possession of popular legitimacy, ideally expressed through representative institutions.17 Benvenisti demolishes this assumption
16. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 296 (describing the
9new realities8 of globalization as 9play[ing] out in an intellectual, political and
legal environment still rooted in the vision of sovereignty as the ultimate
source of authority.8)
17. See THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 90 (Richard Tuck ed., 1996) (1651):
In all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, and
in the state and posture of gladiators; having their weapons
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with an arresting metaphor: the global condominium. As he observes, 9dicn past decades, the predominant conception of sovereignty was akin to owning a large estate separated from other
properties by rivers or desertsZ "y Qontrast, today’s reality is
more analogous to owning a small apartment in one densely
packed high-rise that is home to two hundred separate familiesZ818 Crucially, Benvenisti argues that globalization has
brought about ever less congruence between the persons setting
policies and those affected by them.19 As such, the traditionalist
premise that states speak for their peoples is argued to be increasingly untenable.20
Benvenisti is deeply skeptical that these losses in accountability can be recovered by removing policy-making functions to the
international levelKhe QritiQi`es 9globalist8 theories esQhewing
Westphalian statism altogether, global constitutionalist theories advocating drastic changes to international institutional
structures, and the literature on global administrative law for

pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, their
forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is a
posture of war. But because they uphold thereby, the industry of their subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, which accompanies the liberty of men.
See also JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005) (using rational choice theory to argue that international law primarily reflects the interests of powerful states); JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE
ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW (2015) (criticizing Goldsmith and Posner but
also explicating international law from enlightened self-interest along the lines
of David Gauthier).
18. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 295; BENVENISTI,
Global Governance, supra note 15, at 122N23.
19. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 295, 297N98, 303;
BENVENISTI, Global Governance, supra note 15, at 122.
20. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 297N98:
The solipsist vision of sovereignty as the ultimate source of
authority has survived due to the perception of a perfect or
almost perfect fit between the sovereign and the affected
stakeholdersKits citizens. . . . But in our contemporary global
Qondo/iniu/, the 9teQhnology8 oL global governanQe that operates through discrete sovereign entities no longer exists.
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lacking normative substance.21 Moreover, in other work, Benvenisti adduces numerous domestic and international examples
in evidenQe to de/onstrate that Llights to international 9govern[
anQe8 invariably allow powerLul states to shut out weaHer ones
from international policymaking as well as strengthen unaccountable private lobbies and executive branches at the expense
of domestic legislatures.22 Un short, "envenisti is not 9*uiQH to
endorse the de/ise oL sovereignty8 but Qlai/s instead 9that
through other-regardingness, sovereigns can indirectly promise
global welfare as well as global JustiQeZ823 The state is not dead
but in need of reform. Accordingly, Benvenisti sets out a program premised upon four moral intuitionsKhe Qalls the/ 9nor[
/ative bases824Kcalling for altruistic duties to outsiders. From
these he derives four legal obligations.
"envenisti’s Lirst intuition is that states are neQessary beQause
they remain the only viable means for achieving personal and
communal self-determination.25 In his view, a world without borders would deny the world’s distinQt Qo//unities the ability to
live out their values, while governments become unworkable if
they ranged over populations not held together by what John
:tuart Mill Qalls 9Qo//on sy/pathies8Kthat is, language, religion, ethnicity, or other communal bonds.26 Second, all human
beings possess 9e*ual /oral worth8 entitling the/ to hu/an
rights, which Benvenisti conceives as entitlements to well-being,
again in reliance upon Mill.27 =n this rationale, the world’s gov[
ernments are instituted to ensure the general welfare of human
beings, and each therefore bears the burden of legally justifying
its exclusion of nonmembers.28 This then implies an interna-

21. Id. at 298N300.
22. BENVENISTI, Global Governance, supra note 15, at 73N102. See also Eyal
Benvenisti & George W. Downs, The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy
and the Fragmentation of International Law, 60 STAN. L. REV. 595 (2007) (arguing that fragmentation of international law conduces to the advantage of
powerful states, and that such states deliberately encourage it by setting up
multiple international organizations).
23. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 300.
24. Id. at 301.
25. Id. at 302N03.
26. Id. at 306. Citing JOHN STUART MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 303 (1861).
27. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 306N07.
28. Id. at 307N08.
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tional legal order devoted to hu/an rights, whiQh 9alloQates8 re[
sponsibilities for ensuring the same between governments on
the basis of their ability to promote the interests grounding
those rights.29 In this connection, Benvenisti cites the seminal
Island of Palmas arbitration, where the sole arbitrator, Max Huber, held that the QonQept oL sovereignty 9serves to divide be[
tween nations the space upon which human activities are employed, in order to assure them at all points the minimum of protection of which international law is the guardianZ Z Z Z830 From
this premise, Benvenisti argues that, 9given that the global legal
order has its foundations in human rights, sovereigns can and
should be viewed as organs of a global system that allocates competences and responsibilities for promoting the rights of human
beings and their interest in sustainable utilization of global resourQesZ831 Importantly, he believes that this legal order was actually created at an identifiable point in history: the signing of
the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).32
Third, "envenisti envisions sovereigns as eaerQising 9owner[
ship8 over disQrete portions oL the globe: 9#s /uQh as it is an
extension of the personal right to autonomy, sovereignty is also
the extension of the private claim for ownership. Both ownership
and sovereignty are claims for the intervention in the state of

29. Id. at 308. See also BENVENISTI, Global Governance, supra note 15, at
138N40.
30. Island of Palmas (Neth v. U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 839 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1928).
31. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 307 (internal citations omitted).
32. Id.; See also ProseQutor vZ Tadi', feQision on feLense Motion Lor Unter[
locutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, No. IT-94-1-I, ¶ 97 (Oct. 2, 1995):
[T]he impetuous development and propagation in the international community of human rights doctrines, particularly
after the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights in 1948, has brought about significant changes in international law, notably in the approach to problems besetting the world community. A State-sovereignty-oriented approach has been gradually supplanted by a human-being-oriented approach. Gradually the maxim of Roman law hominum causa omne jus constitutum est (all law is created for the
benefit of human beings) has gained a firm foothold in the
international community. . . .
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nature by Qarving out valuable spaQe Lor eaQlusive useZ833 Therefore, just as the exclusion of distant strangers from government
must be legally justified, so too must their exclusion from property.34 In this regard, Benvenisti invokes a number of famous
tropes from the natural law property theories of Hugo Grotius
and John Locke. First, he cites the famous passage in the Law
of War and Peace, where Grotius likens the original acquisition
of property to occupying a seat in a public theatre: even though
the theatre is originally a publiQ plaQe, 9it is QorreQt to say that
the seat whiQh a /an has taHen belongs to hi/,8 as long as the
persons involved depart as little as possible from natural equity.35 Second, Benvenisti invokes the so-Qalled 9LoQHean pro[
viso,8 whereby LoQHe theori`ed that rights in property Qould be
acquired in a state of nature, as long as one ensured that there
was 9enough and as good, leLt in Qo//on8 Lor others aLter one’s
particular act of enclosure.36 While often viewed as a justification of original acquisition, Benvenisti recasts the Lockean proviso into grounds for limiting established property rights. Although this may be controversial for libertarian Lockeans who
generally claim that the proviso applies only until the creation
of a permanent store of wealth in the form of money,37 Benvenisti’s reading is not without support Lro/ other pro/inent LoQHe
and property scholars.38 In a subsequent work, Benvenisti introduces a fourth normative ground: the interdependence of individual sovereigns.39 Building on his vision of sovereigns as enveloped in a deeper legal order, he argues that sovereignty is not

33. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 308.
34. Id. at 308N09.
35. HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS [ON THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE]
193 (Francis W. Kelsey trans., James Brown Scott ed., 1925) (1625).
36. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 27 (C.B. Macpherson
ed., 1980) (1690). Benvenisti mentions the Lockean proviso at Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 311, n. 87, but cites to the later § 33 instead.
37. See LOCKE, supra note 36, at §§ 46N50; ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA 175N82 (1974).
38. See Jeremy Waldron, Enough and as Good Left for Others, 29 PHIL. Q.
319 (1979) (arguing that the proviso applies not to original acquisition but life
in the civil condition).
39. BENVENISTI, Global Governance, supra note 15, at 143N45.
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an inherent *uality but 9Lreedo/ that is organi`ed by international law and Qo//itted to itZ840
"envenisti’s basiQ /oral Qlai/ is that as bearers oL uni*ue and
awesome powers, sovereigns must have regard, and owe an account, to those whom they affect, whether by action or omission.
Accordingly, Benvenisti identiLies Lour 9trusteeship8 obligations
to distant strangers: _F^ to 9taHe into aQQount8 or give 9due re[
speQt8 in the /aHing oL do/estiQ poliQy to the interests oL distant
strangers whose interests may be affected,41 (2) to allow potentially affected distant strangers to participate and voice opinions
in domestic policymaking processes,42 (3) to accommodate foreign interests when such accommodation would not result in any
loss,43 and (4) to accommodate foreign interests where not doing
so would be catastrophic.44 These broad trusteeship principles
not only obligate sovereigns to outsiders, but also empower them
to legislate for humanity in general. As Benvenisti notes in a
subsequent work:
The trusteeship concept offers a clear endorsement to democracies that wish to unilaterally promote global welfare. . . . As
trustees of humanity, national decision-makers must regard
themselves as partaking in a collective effort to promote global
welfare. . . . In fact, the sovereign-as-trustee concept even
obliges states to pursue such policies. The fact that some states
fail to cooperate should not hinder those who wish to act in pursuit of improving global standards, provided that they take into
account the interests of others when devising policies. . . .45

In terms of generating rights and obligations to provide global
public goods, much heavy lifting is done by the third obligation
40. Id. at 144 (citing Lisbon Treaty judgment, BVerfG, June 30, 2009, 2 BvE
2/08, ¶ 223 (internal citations omitted)).
41. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 314N18. See also
BENVENISTI, Global Governance, supra note 15, at 163 (9Even before the instrumental benefits that accrue from an open and inclusive decision-making process, the intrinsic argument applies: decision-makers that affect the lives of
others must respect and ensure the individual rights of those they affect.8).
42. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 318N20. See also
BENVENISTI, Global Governance, supra note 15, at 162N68.
43. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 320N25.
44. Id. at 325N26.
45. Eyal Benvenisti, Legislating for Humanity: May States Compel Foreigners to Promote Global Welfare?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING: ESSAYS IN
HONOUR OF JAN KLABBERS 3, 12 (2014) [hereinafter Benvenisti, Legislating for
Humanity].
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to accommodate harmless interests, which is invoked to ground
obligations to supply life-saving drugs, allow compulsory licensing of pharmaceutical products, and share disease samples.46
The basic rationale is again that exclusion must be justified, for
which Benvenisti again cites Grotius:
If any person should prevent any other from taking fire from
his fire or light from his torch, I should accuse him of violating
the law of human society. . . . Why then, when it can be done
without any prejudice to his own interests, will not one person
share with another things which are useful to the recipient,
and no loss to the giver?47

This quotation is taken from the chapter of the Free Seas where
Grotius defends the freedom of the high seas in terms of nonexcludability and nonrivalrousness that are highly reminiscent of
economic discourses about public goods.48
"envenisti also reads Vrotius’ torch metaphor as prohibiting
individuals from insisting upon their strict legal rights if it
would be ethically disgraceful or unconscionable to do so—that
is, as an imperative of equity.49 In this connection, he recalls an
equitable precept in Jewish law, which condemns an unbending
insistenQe upon 9what’s /ine is /ine and what’s yours is yours8
as the 9/anner oL :odo/Z850 Again, the principle not only obligates, but also empowersKjust as a maker of a harmless request
has a claim-right to the satisfaction of her request, a state may
presumably enact extraterritorial measures if costless to others,
or if the cost is outweighed by the benefits resulting from the

46. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 324N25.
47. HUGO GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM [THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS] 38 (Ralph
von Deman Magoffin trans., James Brown Scott ed., 1916) (1609).
48. GROTIUS, supra note 47, at 27 (arguing that 9all that has been so constituted by nature that although serving some one person it still suffices for the
common use of all persons, is today and ought in perpetuity to remain in the
same condition as when it was first created by nature.8).
49. See Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486 (Ch.) (stating the
purpose of equity administered by the Chancellor is often to 9mollify the Extremity of the law8); Dudley v. Dudley (1705) 24 Eng. Rep. 118, 119 (Ch.)
(9[E]quity is no part of the law, but a moral virtue which qualifies, moderates
and reform the rigour, hardness and edge of the law.8).
50. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteesship, supra note 15, at 321 (citing AARON
KIRSCHENBAUM, EQUITY IN JEWISH LAW: HALAKHIC ASPIRATIONISM IN JEWISH
CIVIL LAW 187N91 (1991)).
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unilateral measure.51 As Benvenisti puts it, 9LoreignersKincluding foreign statesKaffected by such unilateral policies must consider Qo/plying with the/ due to their own duty to taHe others’
interests into aQQount and to pro/ote global welLareZ852 Crucially, however, Benvenisti requires that his proposed obligation
oL har/less aQQo//odation be li/ited by a Qriterion oL 9re[
striQted Pareto opti/ality,8 Lorbidding states Lro/ oLLering
themselves up to foreign interests in exchange for side payments.53 In order to substantiate his claim that the obligation of
harmless accommodation is either already law or is in the process of becoming law, Benvenisti cites Right of Passage over Indian Territory,54 the Iron Rhine Railway arbitration,55 Dispute
Regarding Navigational and Related Rights,56 and the Lake
Lanoux arbitration.57 These cases will be examined in detail in
Part V.
#ltogether, "envenisti’s theory oL sovereign trusteeship Qan be
characterized as (1) proceeding from interests, (2) conceiving of
sovereign states as tools deployed for precisely this purpose by a
wider international order, and (3) equitable, in that ethical
standards may sometimes displace legal rules. The same three
ideas are expressed by Anne Peters:
[T]he humanized concept of sovereignty leads to a reassessment of humanitarian intervention, all the while insisting that
the prohibition on intervention must be upheld as the rule. . . .
When humanity, i.e. human needs, is taken as the doctrinal
and systematic starting point of legal argument, the focus is
shiLted Lro/ states’ rights to states’ obligations towards natu[
ral persons. . . . In the humanist perspective, the [U.N. Security] Council has the duty to authorize humanitarian action if
51. Benvenisti does say, however, that this equitable right is not necessarily
enforceable. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 314 (observing that there is no obligation to 9succumb8 to interests of foreigners expressed
in consultation processes).
52. See Benvenisti, Legislating for Humanity, supra note 45, at 12.
53. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 320N21.
54. Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 1960 I.C.J. 6
(Apr. 12).
55. Iron Rhine Railway, (Belg. v. Neth.), 27 R.I.A.A. 35 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
2005).
56. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, (Costa Rica v.
Nicar.), 2009 I.C.J. 212 (July 13).
57. Lake Lanoux Arbitration, (Fr. v. Spain), 12 R.I.A.A. 281 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1957).
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the very narrow conditions of right cause, proper purpose, and
proportionality are fulfilled.58

Another scholar following this liberal approach is Cedric Ryngaert, who draws upon "envenisti to develop a si/ilar 9e*uitybased8 theory, where unilateral /easures to advanQe global pub[
liQ goods are per/itted on ethiQal prinQiples oL 9reasonable[
nessZ859 Ryngaert deLines the preQise Qontours oL 9reasonable[
ness8 as being _F^ 9reasonableness8 in ter/s oL the distribution
of costs and benefits between the sovereign enacting the measure and the sovereign imposed upon,60 _E^ 9dual illegality,8 that
is, where the unilateral measure legitimate regulates conduct
prohibited under the law of the territory where it occurs,61 (3)
9de/oQratiQ partiQipation8 by outsiders potentially aLLeQted by
the measure,62 _C^ 9e*uivalenQe8 or nondupliQation oL /easures
across sovereigns,63 and (5) compensation offered by the state
taking the unilateral measure to the state whose interests are
affected.64 ;yngaert’s last /aai/ QontradiQts "envenisti’s re[
stricted Pareto optimality limitation, which prohibits states
from accepting payments in exchange for accommodating foreign interests.
A. Harms and Wrongs
This seQtion identiLies Qertain proble/s with "envenisti’s Qon[
cept of sovereign trusteeship, which set the stage for an alternative, republican account of unilateral jurisprudence to provide

58. Anne Peters, Humanity as the A and Ω of Sovereignty, 20 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 513, 544 (2009). See also id. at 514 (arguing that 9the normative status of
sovereignty is derived from humanity, understood as the legal principle that
human rights, interests, needs, and security must be respected and promoted,
and that this humanistic principle is also the telos of the international legal
order.8).
59. CEDRIC RYNGAERT, UNILATERAL JURISDICTION AND GLOBAL VALUES 124N
30 (2015) [hereinafter RYNGAERT, Unilateral Jurisdiction]. See also CEDRIC
RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, Chapter 5 (2d ed. 2015) (setting out a 9reasonableness8 approach to jurisdictional questions in general but
acknowledging that it is not the accepted method of addressing jurisdictional
questions outside the United States).
60. RYNGAERT, Unilateral Jurisdiction, supra note 59, at 111N18.
61. Id. at 118N21.
62. Id. at 121N33.
63. Id. at 133N35.
64. Id. at 135N40.
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global publiQ goodsZ !onsider again "envenisti’s proposed obli[
gation to accommodate the interests of outsiders where costless.
While Benvenisti recognizes that states differ in some fundamental way from private persons,65 his rationale from property
ownership and his use of the Grotian torch metaphor mean that
that obligation must in principle be applicable to private persons. After all, private persons own property. This, however,
brings to light certain problems.
Consider a total stranger who enters your house in the middle
of the night, not to steal or damage anything, but only to admire
you while you sleep. It is hard to imagine any legal system that
would obligate you to accommodate him, even though his visits
cost you absolutely nothing. To the contrary, they would actively
provide you a cause of action against him. For instance, a seminal English precedent of civil and constitutional significance on
both sides oL the #tlantiQ pronounQes that 9no /an Qan set Loot
upon his neighbour’s Qlose without his leave% if he does he is a
trespasser, though he does no da/age at allZ Z Z Z866 Similarly,
batteries are actionable even if entirely painlessKall you need
is an unwelcome and intentional touching, such as if your visitor
ran his fingers through your hair as you slept.67 It might be exceedingly ungracious of you to proceed against such a harmless
admirer, but you have your cause of action regardless. In fact,
you would have it even if he positively advanced your material
welfare, say, by doing your laundry before leaving.68 In short, it
is possible to wrong someone without harming them.
Secondly, consider that there are regrettably many people in
the world who suffer from renal failure while you, through no
special merit of your own, are blessed with two healthy kidneys.
Should the law compel you to part with a superfluous kidney,
say, to a close relative in desperate need? Such an obligation
/ight Lollow not Just Lro/ "envenisti’s proposed obligation to
65. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 306.
66. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 817 (KB).
67. MARC A. FRANKLIN, INJURIES AND REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES 606 (1979) (arguing that battery 9is not limited
to serious injuries; a man who suffers the indignity of having his coat lapels
grabbed or of being spat on may recover.8).
68. ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, PRIVATE WRONGS 49, n. 29 (2016) [hereinafter
RIPSTEIN, Private Wrongs] (citing Susan Warren, ‘Cleaning Fairy,’ Accused Of
Breaking Into Home And Cleaning It, HUFFINGTON POST (May 31, 2012, 12:36
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/05/31/susan-warren-cleaning-fairybroke-into-home-cleaned-ohio_n_1559477.html.)
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accommodate costless interests, but also from his fourth proposed obligation to avert catastrophes. Nevertheless, it is hard
to imagine any court ordering you to do so, even though it would
be despicable of you not to donate your kidney in such circumstances.69 Evidently, it is also possible to harm someone, grievously, without wronging them. You might start a business that
drives another’s into banHruptQy, resulting in hi/ and his el[
derly grandmother being evicted from their cottage, in the middle of a snowstorm on Christmas Eve. As unquestionably bad as
it is, you have not wronged him. This consideration, if taken,
puts "envenisti’s theory oL sovereign trusteeship in grave dan[
ger because it undermines its first premise. The mere fact that
globalization presents us with incomparably many more opportunities to inflict significant harms upon each other, does not
necessarily mean we thereby violate a single legal obligation toward one other, or even that we have any.70
B. Public Actors and Human Rights Jurisdiction
At this point, Benvenisti might attempt a rescue from his second normative groundKthat is, his notion of the UDHR as a
global original contract constituting an international order devoted to advancing human rights understood in terms of wellbeing, and as allocating human rights obligations among the
various sovereign states according to their ability to advance
well-being. If successful, this would allow Benvenisti to distinguish between private individuals and sovereigns, and to impose
unique obligations of altruism upon the latter, thus nullifying
the objections made in the previous section.

69. McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D.&C. 3d 90, 91N92 (1978) (holding that the
court lacked equitable power to enjoin defendant to donate bone marrow via
painful but not life-threatening medical procedure to plaintiffKa relative dying of a rare bone diseaseKdespite finding the defendant’s conduct 9morally
indefensible8); Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990) (refusing to order
defendant, the mother and legal guardian of twins, of whom plaintiff was the
father, to submit the twins for medical tests to see if they were suitable as bone
marrow donors for another of the plaintiff’s children, a twelve-year-old dying
of leukemia).
70. See Mattias Kumm, The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: An
Integrated Conception of Public Law, 20 INDIANA J. GLOB. LEG. STUD. 605, 624
(2013) (9Interdependence alone is not itself sufficient to establish the duty of a
national community to take into account the effects of their actions on outsiders.8).
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On this conception of the human rights practice, the clauses
on 9state JurisdiQtion8 or 9hu/an rights JurisdiQtion8 that deLine
the sQope oL a state party’s obligations arising under /ost hu[
man rights treaties ought to track eaQh state’s ability to aLLeQt
the interests of human beings all over the world. Precisely such
a view is taken by Marko Milanovic in his widely cited monograph on the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties.71 Specifically, Milanovic argues that 9negative8 hu/an
rights obligations apply universally because it is always within
a state’s power not to harm someone,72 while 9positive8 obliga[
tions to provide resources or services are limited to state territory because they require greater levels of coordination with actors not under the state’s eLLeQtive QontrolZ73 Thirdly, Milanovic
postulates that there Qan be eatraterritorial positive 9proQedural
and prophylaQtiQ8 obligations to investigate Hillings outside oL
state territory, on the basis that such killings might have been
perpetrated by agents under the state’s QontrolZ74
These propositions, however, do not reflect actual legal practice, especially that of the European Court of Human Rights,
whose jurisprudence on extraterritorial human rights obligations arising under the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) is particularly prominent and well-developed.75 One obvious way in which a state may adversely affect the well-being
of distant human beings would be by dropping bombs on them.
It is also always within a state’s ability not to bomb someone.
Despite this, however, it is almost certain that if an ECHR state
party were to launch drone strikes upon persons far away, any
action brought on their behalf would be declared inadmissible as
falling outside that state’s JurisdiQtionZ PreQisely suQh a result

71. MARKO MILANOVIC, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TREATIES: LAW, PRINCIPLES, AND POLICY (2011).
72. Id. at 212N15.
73. Id. at 210N11.
74. Id. at 215N19.
75. See Samantha Besson, The Extraterritoriality of the European Convention on Human Rights: Why Human Rights Depend on Jurisdiction and What
Jurisdiction Amounts to, 25 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 857, 858 (2012) (arguing that
Milanovic is 9too quick to assimilate [human rights jurisdiction] to some kind
of mere factual power or control test.8); Aravind Ganesh, The European Union’s
Human Rights Obligations Towards Distant Strangers, 37 MICH. J. INT’L L.
475, 518N25 (2016) (questioning all three of Milanovic’s proposed general
rules).
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obtained in Banković, which concerned an action brought by relatives of civilians killed during the NATO bombing of Belgrade.76 !ertainly, /ost oL the Qourt’s reasoning has been aban[
doned after deserved criticism.77 That said, an application
brought today on similar facts would be dismissed just the same.
This time, however, the dismissal would follow from the reasoning in Al-Skeini, which definitively settles that human rights jurisdiction under the ECHR arises only where a state party exerQises 9eLLeQtive Qontrol8 over the territory where the purported
violation taHes plaQe, or iL its agents eaerQised 9authority and
Qontrol8 over the individuals whose hu/an rights were purport[
edly violated.78 As Milanovic recognizes:
Bankovic is . . . still perfectly correct in its result. While the
ability to Hill is 9authority and Qontrol8 over the individual iL
the state has public powers, killing is not authority and control
if the state is merely firing missiles from an aircraft. Under
this reasoning, drone operations in Yemen or wherever would
be just as excluded from the purview of human rights treaties
as under Bankovic.79

Thus, the hu/an rights praQtiQe QontradiQts "envenisti’s assu/ption that a state’s hu/an rights obligations traQH its QapaQ[
ity to aLLeQt an individual’s /aterial interests, say, in eaistenQeZ
Even if one reads Benvenisti as making only the weaker claim
that the UDHR should be interpreted as imposing legal obligations on states to advance human flourishing where feasible, the
LaQt re/ains that the settled JurisprudenQe oL the world’s preeminent human rights court totally contradicts that proposition.
76. "anHovi' vZ "elgium and others, 2001-XII, Eur. Ct. H.R. 335. See also
El-Shifa Pharm. Indus. Co. v. United States, 378 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
cert. denied, BCB 7Z:Z FFD> _EXXB^ _PlaintiLL’s LaQtory in :udan was destroyed
by a 7Z:Z bo/b striHeZ PlaintiLL’s Qlai/ Lor Qompensation under the Takings
Clause was dismissed as a nonjusticiable political question).
77. See Yuval Shany, Taking Universality Seriously: A Functional Approach
to Extraterritoriality in International Human Rights Law, 7 L. & ETHICS HUM.
RTS 49, 51N56 (2013). MilanoviQ’s /onograph was oLLered largely as a Qriti*ue
of the Banković decision. See MILANOVIC, supra note @F, at EAC _9U Qertainly do
not suffer from the naïve belief that my proposed model of extraterritorial application will be adopted any time soon. At least when it comes to Strasbourg,
it requires a major departure from existing jurisprudence, above all from
BankovicZ8^Z
78. Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom, (2011) 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, ¶¶ 133N40.
79. Marko Milanovic, Al-Skeini and Al-Jedda in Strasbourg, 23 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 121, 130 (2012) (internal citations omitted).
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Instead, it appears that you can purposely be dealt the most appalling harms without having even the beginnings of a human
rights claim. The attempt to abolish the difference between
harms and wrongs by invoking human rights fails because the
human rights practice itself makes that distinction.
C. The Failure of the Argument from Well-Being
The mere fact that we nowadays increasingly affect each other
does not automatically mean we also have legal claims against
each other. Moreover, it is not plausible as a matter of legal doctrine to say that sovereigns owe duties of welfare advancement
to the whole world in general. Rather, the crucial question is how
the unilateral decisions of one state or political community could
possibly bind others, even if the various costs and benefits were
calibrated perfectly. As Mattias Ku// notes, 9the /ore eLLeQtive
provision of public goods globally is not itself an argument
against denying states the authority to determine for themselves
whether and how to address issues relating to the provision of
publiQ goodsZ880 Moreover, while international law provides
means to reap the benefits of better cooperation and coordination between interdependent actors . . . this assertion merely
provides a functional argument for states to sign up for certain
kinds of international cooperative endeavors. It does not, without further argument, undermine the claim that it is within
the state’s authority to deQide on how to address QonQerns sur[
rounding the provision of public goods.81

Such considerations are reflected by the principle of nonintervention in Article 2(7) of the Charter of the United Nations,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) relied upon in
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
to hold that 9dicntervention is wrongLul when it uses /ethods oL
coercion in regard to such choices, which must remain free
onesZ882

80. Mattias Kumm, Sovereignty and the Right to Be Left Alone: Subsidiarity, Justice-Sensitive Externalities, and the Proper Domain of the Consent Requirement in International Law, 79 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 239, 244 (2016).
81. Id.
82. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 205 (June 27).
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Wor these reasons, /ost oL ;yngaert’s rules oL reasonableness
are equally objectionable. Cagliostro could not legitimately prescribe one Jot or tittle oL regulation regarding ;uritania’s oil[
fields even if it extended Ruritanian citizens rights not just to sit
in at its legislative hearings, but to vote in its general elections.
Nor would it have any right to enact extraterritorial laws for Ruritanians simply because, contrary to a human rights treaty
binding upon both parties, Ruritania habitually issued parking
tickets in a manner violating the right against self-incriminationZ Moreover, ;yngaert’s Qontention that eatraterritorial
measures are reasonable if they regulate conduct tainted by
9dual illegality8 is QontradiQted by the 7Z:Z 9publiQ law taboo,8
whiQh holds that 9the Qourts oL no Qountry will eaeQute the penal
laws oL anotherZ883 7lti/ately, 9reasonableness8 is oL no help be[
cause people have radically differing visions of what that means.
For this reason, rather than offering a pragmatic solution to
proble/s oL global Qoordination, a 9reasonableness8 approaQh to
unilateral jurisdiction might actually be the perfect recipe for
discord.
;yngaert QonQedes as /uQh, observing that invoQations oL 9Ju[
risdiQtional reasonableness8 as pioneered in 7.S. antitrust law
have 9not surprisingly - come under severe criticism for failing
to provide legal Qertainty884 and that when 9eaerQising unilateral
jurisdiction in the perceived global interest, it appears indeed
inevitable that states will apply their notions of global justice to
Loreign territories and personsZ885 Nevertheless, he claims that
despite the laQH oL Qonsensus on 9a globally shared Justice conception . . . to reject reasonableness means to accept either that
jurisdictional problems can be solved via bright-lines of territoriality or personality or that such problems cannot be solved at
allZ886 Similarly, Benvenisti acknowledges that imperial powers
oLten /ade appeals to 9hu/anity8 when subJugating other peo[
ples, and that his proposed obligations of altruism may be too
heavy for developing states to bear.87 Nevertheless, he remarks
83. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 481 (1923). See Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena: Conflict of Laws, International
Law and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUEIL DES COURS 311,
322N26 (1980).
84. RYNGAERT, Unilateral Jurisdiction, supra note 59, at 113.
85. Id. at 114.
86. Id.
87. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 328.
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so/ewhat Qhillingly that 9the starH *uestion Lor the weaHer
countries is whether clinging to formal nineteenth century-type
sovereignty re/ains in their best interestZ888 Essentially, the liberal theories end in counsels of despairKthey acknowledge their
deep problems, but plead for them to be ignored because that is
the best that can be done. It must therefore be examined
whether there are any viable alternatives.
II. PRIVATE RIGHT: DIGNITY AS FREEDOM FROM DOMINATION
Consider again the problem of the secret visitor. Why do legal
systems almost universally allow legal redress against him, despite his utter harmlessnessKor even advantageKto you? An interest theorist might argue on rule-utilitarian lines that trespassers are almost always up to no good, so that while your particular secret visitor might have been harmless, overall societal
interests in personal security are more likely to be advanced
than set back by a general prohibition against such conduct.
Moreover, given our default assumptions about intruders:
The thought that at any moment complete strangers might
freely enter and observe these most intimately personal places
will leave most of us profoundly uncomfortable; the fact that
they would do no damage, harbor no ill intentions, or that we
would be unaware of their presence would do little to remove
that discomfort.89

#nother strategy would be to speQiLy Qertain 9proteQted inter[
ests8 as deserving heightened proteQtion beQause they are Lun[
damental to the enjoyment of all other interests. For instance,
Jason Varuhas accounts for the wrongfulness of harmless trespasses beQause 9/y interest in the eaQlusive possession oL land
is a more important and inherently valuable interest than my
interest in quiet enjoyment of land (exclusive possession of land
is basic in that before I can freely enjoy my land I must have
do/inion over it^Z890 On this view, the law provides remedies to
88. Id.
89. See Colin Bird, Harm Versus Sovereignty: A Reply to Ripstein, 35 PHIL.
& PUB. AFFS. 179, 184 (2007). See JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 81 (Parker, Son & Bourn eds., 1863) (9The interest involved is that of security, to everyone’s feelings the most vital of interests. Nearly all other earthly benefits are
needed by one person, not needed by another . . . but security no human being
can possibly do without. . . .8).
90. Jason N.E. Varuhas, The Concept of “Vindication” in the Law of Torts:
Rights, Interests and Damages, 34 OXF. J. LEG. STUD. 253, 259 (2014).
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9vindiQate8 suQh proteQted interests out oL an abundanQe oL Qau[
tion, and the seQret visitor’s trespass is said to result not in /a[
terial da/age, but in 9nor/ative8 da/ageZ91
The first, rule-utilitarian strategy appears limited to types of
conduct that are ordinarily harmful or unproductive of social
benefit.92 It cannot account for instances where conduct is actionable despite being of a type that is presumptively beneficialKfor instance, when lifesaving medical treatment is administered to persons refusing consent for religious reasons.93 Nor
does the resort to feelings of discomfort or other forms of psychological pain seem proper, or even helpful. Depending upon their
culture and upbringing, people may respond with deep, visceral
distress at radically opposite things; from the sight of a woman
with her face unveiled, to the sight of a woman with her face
veiledZ The 9proteQted interest8 strategy, on the other hand,
strains the meaning of the word 9Lunda/entalZ8 The interests in
corporeal integrity and in liberty supposedly grounding battery
seem foundational enough, but the same cannot be said of the
interest in exclusive possession of land which supposedly
grounds trespass. As demonstrated by Grotius’s eaa/ple oL the
torch, and by the case of the secret visitor, it is possible to enjoy
your home without excluding others, say, when you are asleep
or away on holiday. The interest in reputation, on the other
hand, does not see/ 9basiQ8 in any robust sense, certainly not
more so than the interest in food and shelter. In fact, losing your
reputation could be a most liberating experience. Finally, the
claim that harmless torts nevertheless cause normative or
9/oral8 da/age bears the distinQt air oL *uestion-beggingKof

91. See id. at 258 (9In this sense, vindication means to attest to, affirm and
reinforce the importance and inherent value of particular interests.8); and id.
at 268 (9[I]n order to mark the conceptual distinction between such damage,
which exists solely on the legal plane, and other forms of damage which correspond with real-world effects, we might describe such damage as 6normative’
in nature.8).
92. Bird, supra note 89, at 188 (arguing that a general prohibition against
harmless trespasses makes sense on the rule-utilitarian account because
9there is no vital social interest in sleeping in other people’s beds.8).
93. See Malette v. Shulman, [1990] 72 O.R. 2d 417 (Can. C.A.) (holding doctor liable in battery and awarding damages of $20,000 CAD for knowingly administering a life-saving blood transfusion to a Jehovah’s Witness).
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smuggling into the premises the very conclusion sought to be derived.94
Interest-based theorists no doubt have other ingenious strategies to offer, but this article cannot anticipate them all. As such,
the possibility cannot be excluded that the prohibition against
harmless trespasses does indeed maximize aggregate welfare in
the world, and that the judges from various legal traditions who
crafted broadly similar rules over the centuries somehow were
aware of this despite not being trained in econometrics or empirical methods. Instead, this article can only suggest the following
provisional but intuitive explanation: The reason why the secret
visitor wrongs you by entering your house or by touching without your consent, even if he does you no harm, is because your
body and your house are yours. Only you get to decide what to
do with your house and your body. Likewise, you do not wrong
someone when you refuse to donate them your kidney, because
your organs are yours, not theirs. If others could simply help
themselves to your body or your property to satisfy their desires
or even needs, that would mean you had neither a life nor purposes of your own. It is irrelevant that their purposes may be
ultimately beneficial to you; a slave who is extravagantly provided for by his master is nevertheless wronged by him. Dignity
lies not in being kept happy by being supplied with things necessary for the satisfaction of interests, even the very basic ones
called needs. Nor is it even to be understood as the freedom to
do whatever you like, for that is just another way of describing
the satisfaction of interests. A slave whose master is on permanent holiday nevertheless lacks dignity because of the simple
94. See Baget c. Rosenweigh, Cass. (Ch. Réunies) 15 juin 1833, Sirey
1833.I.458 (Fr.), the seminal French decision that introduced the concept of
moral damage into French civil law. The case concerned a claim by certain
licensed Paris pharmacists intervening as civil parties in criminal proceedings
against certain unlicensed pharmacists. The plaintiffs were unable to establish
any quantifiable material loss as required for all delictual (tortious) actions by
Articles 1382N1383 of the French Civil Code. Id. at 459N60. The Court of Cassation nevertheless held that the plaintiffs could recover for 9moral damage,8
on grounds that 9the illegal conduct of the pharmacy trade necessarily involves
harm to the pharmacists, since it constitutes a usurpation of the rights guaranteed them by the law. . . .8 Id. at 462N63 [l’exercice illégal de la pharmacie
porte nécessairement un dommage aux pharmaciens, puisqu’il constitue une
usurpation des droits qui leur sont garantis par la loi. . . .]. In short, the court
manufactured 9moral damage8 solely to get around the Civil Code’s requirement of damage for delictual claims.
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fact that he is still completely dependent upon the master’s willZ
Instead, dignity consists in freedom in the sense of independence; that is, in not being subject to the will of another. This idea
constitutes the single regulative principle from which the argument of the rest of this article flows.
A. Private Legal Relations
The 9republiQan8 theory set out in this artiQle draws upon
Sant’s legal and politiQal philosophy, as eapressed in the Perpetual Peace and Doctrine of Right. To this end, this section provides a su//ary oL Sant’s basiQ legal QonQepts, Lro/ which he
eventually crafts a comprehensive theory of constitutional, international, and cosmopolitan law. The following discussions of
such private law concepts as damage, injury, property, and personality may seem unusual in the context of an article purporting to deal with public international law. They are, however, cruQial, beQause these QonQepts per/eate the entirety oL Sant’s legal
philosophy.
In the Doctrine of Right, Kant draws a fundamental distinction
between persons and things. A person is defined as 9a subJeQt
whose aQtions Qan be i/puted to hi/8 as a result oL whiQh he is
9subJeQt to no other laws than those he gives to hi/selLZ895 In
contrast, a thing is an 9obJeQt oL Lree QhoiQe8 to whiQh 9nothing
Qan be i/putedZ896 Being treated rightly as a person consists in
being treated appropriately aQQording to one’s nature as a per[
son. A wrong, on the other hand, occurs when a person is dominated or instrumentalized as a thing. Accordingly, the concept
of dignity as non-do/ination /eans that 9Freedom (independenQe Lro/ being Qonstrained by another’s QhoiQe^, insoLar as it
can coexist with the freedom of every other in accordance with a
universal law, is the only original right belonging to every man
by virtue oL his hu/anityZ897
This 9innate8 right gives rise to three Hinds oL 9aQ*uired8
rights: 9a right to a thing _ius reale), or a right against a person
(ius personale), or a right to a person akin to a right to a thing
(ius realiter personale), that is, possession (though not use) of

95. DR 6:223, at 378.
96. Id.
97. DR 6:237, at 393.
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another person as a thingZ898 This crucial passage can be explicated as follows: a thing can be both used and possessed at the
same time. If your dignity lies in being treated as a person and
not as a thing, this does not mean that you can never be possessed or used. It simply means that you cannot be possessed
and used at the same time. This leads to three possible categories of legal rights; that is, claims that are morally permissible
to enforce through coercion:99
(1) Tortious rights entitle one person to prevent all other persons from interfering with the things she is rightfully controlling
in pursuit of her purposesKher property and her person.100 (The
question of how one comes to be in rightful control of things shall
be explained in the next part.)
(2) Contractual rights entitle one person to use another personKthey 9enable parties to /odiLy their respeQtive rights, so
that one person is entitled to depend upon the specified deed of
anotherZ8101 For instance, your employer gets to use you in pursuit of her purposes. If she uses you, however, she cannot also
possess you. You must have signed up for the job, and you can
always quit. A contractual right is therefore to performances; to
delivery, rather than title.102
(3) Fiduciary rights arise where a person is entitled to possess anotherKthat is, to 9bind8 the/ by their deQisionsZ UL you
are a child, your mother can tell you to eat your dinner, and you
must do it. If your attorney accepts a settlement offer, you must
live with it. If they possess you, however, they cannot also use

98. DR 6:260, at 412. See also DR 6:247, at 402 (describing three categories
of external objects of choice as 91) a (corporeal) thing external to me8; 2) another’s choice to perform a specific deed (praestatio); 3) another’s status in relation to me8); RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 76 (describing
the 9triangulation8 of the 9category of status in relation to property and contract.8).
99. DR 6:231, at 388 (defining 9[r]ight [as] connected with an authorization
to use coercion.8).
100. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 66N69 (describing this
category of rights as 9property,8 paralleled by similar rights against interferences with one’s person).
101. Id. at 69.
102. DR 6:274, at 424.
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you. The decisions they make in respect of you have to be consistent with your purposes, never theirs.103 The conception of fiduciary relations discussed here has nothing to do with equity104
or with notions of differentiated and limited property ownership
associated with trusts in English law. Instead, the concern is
with obligations arising Lro/ another’s 9possession8 oL you, that
is, their entitlement to dispose of your rights regardless of your
choice.105
The categories of rights most relevant for the purposes of this
article are those pertaining to tortious and fiduciary relations.
The next section elaborates on torts and describes the distinct
sub-categories of damage and injury.
B. The Division of Torts: Property and Personality Wrongs
Torts are defined as interferences with your means, that is, the
things you are rightfully using and/or possessing in pursuit of

103. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 70N76 (describing the
category as 9status8 relations). The 9legal relation between a fiduciary and a
beneficiary is one such case8 of status relations. Id. at 73.
104. Contrary to the sources cited at note 49, Kant does not treat equitable
claims as demands upon ethical principles extraneous to law. He acknowledges
that they are legal claims, but argues that they cannot alone authorize coercion
because they lack crucial particulars, which then requires judges to employ
their discretion. As such, equity can be invoked by a judge only when disposing
of her own rightsKsay, whether or not to accept irregularly filed pleadingsK
or the rights of someone on whose behalf she is authorized to speak, such as
the sovereign in a lawsuit between the sovereign and his employees. In other
cases, equity is a 9mute divinity who cannot be heard.8 DR 6:234-35, at 390N
91.
105. For greater color on the notion of fiduciary relations animating this article, see Paul B. Miller, A Theory of Fiduciary Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235,
278 (2010) (defining a fiduciary relationship as that in which one person 9exercises discretionary authority to set or pursue practical interests (including
matters of personality, welfare or right) of another.8); Paul B. Miller, Justifying
Fiduciary Duties, 58 MCGILL L. J. 969, 1012N13 (2013) (arguing that 9fiduciary
power is not properly understood as connoting relative strength, ability, or influence . . . [but] ought to be understood as a form of authority,8 or the ability
to 9render rightful conduct that would otherwise be wrongful.8); Frame v.
Smith, [1987] 2 S.C.R. 99, ¶ 60 (Can.) (Wilson J., dissenting) (defining a fiduciary relation as one where: 9(1) the fiduciary has scope for the exercise of some
discretion or power; (2) the fiduciary can unilaterally exercise that power or
discretion so as to affect the beneficiary’s legal or practical interests; and (3)
the beneficiary is peculiarly vulnerable to or at the mercy of the fiduciary holding the discretion or power8).
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your purposesZ The Lrustration oL a 9/ere wish8106Ka project you
would like to accomplish but do not have the means forKmay
harm you, but it does not wrong you. As Ripstein explains:
What you can accomplish depends on what others are doingK
someone else can frustrate your plans by getting the last quart
of milk in the store. If they do so, they don’t interfere with your
independence, because they impose no limits on your ability to
use your powers to set and pursue your purposes. They just
change the world in ways that make your means useless for the
particular purpose you would have set.107

For this reason, you do not wrong someone if you refuse to donate them your kidney, because their need for it, no matter how
urgent, is just a mere wish. Your organs are not their means.
If torts are understood as wrongful interferences with means,
there are just two ways another may commit one against you:
she may deprive you of your means, or she may use your means
for her purposes rather than yours.108 The first category covers
losses arising from deprivations of means.109 Merely reducing
the value of your meansKfor example, your businessKdoes not
deprive you of it. It simply changes the world around you, making your means unsuitable for the purposes you had intended,
and is therefore unrecoverable pure economic loss. Moreover,
mere deprivation of, or physical damage to your things is not
enough. Instead, you must have suffered loss arising from that
damageKonly then does another’s interLerenQe with your things
constitute a deprivation of your means.110 In contrast, for the
106. DR 6:230, at 387.
107. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 16.
108. See RIPSTEIN, Private Wrongs, supra note 68, at 43N52.
109. See id. at 48N50.
110. See PETER BIRKS, THE ROMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: THE COLLECTED
PAPERS OF PETER BIRKS 195N96 (Eric Descheemaeker ed. 2014) (arguing that
the accidental castration of a slave-boy does not give rise to a wrongful damage
claim because it actually increases his value), citing DIG. 9.2.23.8 (Ulpian, Ad
Edictum 18). Ripstein appears to take a different view, that another may
9wrong you by depriving you of [your] means even if you had no plans to use
them.8 RIPSTEIN, Private Wrongs, supra note 68, at 48. For this purpose, he
cites Lord Halsbury L.C.’s asking rhetorically if 9a person took away a chair
out of my room and kept it for twelve months, could anybody say you had a
right to diminish the damages by showing I did not usually sit in that chair, or
that there were plenty of other chairs in the room?8 The Mediana, [1900] App.
Cas. 113, 117 (Eng.). The sentences immediately following reveal Lord Halsbury characterizing the taking away of the chair as wrongful use rather than
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second category of tortsKthat is, wrongful useKharm is irrelevant because you have not actually lost anything.111 Your secret
visitor’s trespass is not inQonsistent with your possessing and
using your house because, evidently, you can still do this.
This logic carries over into the remedies. If someone has deprived you of your means, she must give it back to youKcompensation. In contrast, compensation cannot remedy wrongful
uses.112 Instead, because purposes are wrongful if accomplished
through the wrongLul use oL others’ /eans, they thereLore Qannot
be suffered to exist, and must therefore be reversed in restitution. For instance, if you lead tour groups through onyx caves
partly lying under your neighbor’s land, you /ust hand over the
appropriate portion of the profits.113 While both compensation
and restitution serve the same purpose of reversing wrongs, they
diLLer in that 9dQco/pensation plaQes the viQti/ in the pre-wrong
position, whereas restitution places the agent in the pre-wrong
positionZ8114 For this reason, restitution and compensation might
sometimes bear a surface resemblance. For instance, if someone
wrongful deprivation. See id. at 117N18, remarking that 9when you are endeavouring to establish the specific loss of profit . . . [i]n that case you must shew
it, and by precise evidence . . . [b]ut when we are speaking of general damages
no such principle applies at all.8
111. See RIPSTEIN, Private Wrongs, supra note 68, at 46N48; BIRKS, supra note
110, at 224 (arguing, regarding iniuria, that 9[t]he evaluation is not of damnum. It is not about loss. That is the province of the lex Aquilia.8). The Lex
Aquilia was a plebiscite enacted probably in the first half of the third century
BCE, which introduced the concept of compensatory remedies for damage to
property. Prior to this, fixed rates for different kinds of damages were set individually in the Twelve Tables. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF
OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 953N961 (1996).
112. See Merest v. Harvey (1814) 128 Eng. Rep. 761, 761 (CP) (Gibbs C.J.)
(9Suppose a gentleman has a paved walk in his paddock, before his window,
and that a man walks up and down before the window of his house, and looks
in while the owner is at dinner, is the trespasser to be permitted to say, 6here
is a halfpenny for you, which is the full extent of the mischief I have done?’
Would that be a compensation? I cannot say that it would be.8).
113. Edwards v. Lee’s Administrator, 265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1025 (1936).
See also Ministry of Defence v. Ashman (1993) 25 H.L.R. 513 (C.A.) (Eng.)
(Hoffmann L.J.) (holding that 9[a] person entitled to possession of land can
make a claim against a person who has been in occupation without his consent
on two alternative bases. The first is for the loss which he has suffered in consequence of the defendant’s trespass. . . . The second is the value of the benefit
which the occupier has received. This is a claim for restitution. . . .8).
114. FRANCESCO GIGLIO, THE FOUNDATIONS OF RESTITUTION FOR WRONGS 225
(2007).
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spits in your face and you contract a disease from it, your remedy
will include your medical bills. This, however, is not because
compensation is the proper remedy but because erasing the tortLeasor’s wrongLul purpose inQludes setting baQH those eapensesZ
The opposite does not hold for the first category of torts. If you
negligently run over your neighbor’s rosebushes while rushing
to collect your lottery winnings, you need only replace the rosebushes. You need not undo your purpose by handing over your
winnings.
Such a description of the law of torts and its attendant remedies might sound surprising to Anglo-American lawyers, for
whom the idea of gain-based or restitutionary remedies for tort
is radically heterodox.115 It is, however, trite in the Roman law,
where the categories of wrongful damage and wrongful use are
represented in the law of delict by the division between actions
for damnum iniuria datum (loss given by a wrong) and iniuria
(wrongs).116 The former comprises only violations of property
rights,117 whereas the latter pertains to violations of personality
rightsKenumerated canonically as rights in body, reputation,
and dignitas (status, honor, or worth.)118 The identification of
wrongful damage solely with property rights and wrongful use
solely with personality rights may sound curious, as it seems apparent that one Qan wrongLully da/age another’s body or wrong[
Lully use another’s propertyZ Wor instanQe, #nglo-American lawyers may tend to think of trespass primarily as a violation of a
property right, actionable the moment the trespasser sets foot
on any part of your land.119 In contrast, in Roman law a trespass
115. See Varuhas, supra note 90, at 284N89 (arguing against a trend in English cases recognizing restitutionary remedies in tort); JASON N.E. VARUHAS,
DAMAGES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 57 (2016) (observing that 9despite damages for
trespass to land being classified as compensatory for nearly their entire history, under the influence of restitution theorists some courts have, in recent
times, classified user damages as restitutionary. . . .8).
116. See, e.g., ROBERT W. LEE, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN-DUTCH LAW 271
(1915) (9The underlying principles of injuria and damnum injuria datum are
applicable to all kinds of delict. To-day all delictual liabilities (with few exceptions) are referable to one or other of these two heads.8); WILLIAM W. BUCKLAND
& ARNOLD D. MCNAIR, ROMAN LAW AND COMMON LAW: A COMPARISON IN
OUTLINE 340N44 (1965).
117. All claims for economic loss were made under the Lex Aquilia. See BIRKS,
supra note 110, at 195N98.
118. DIG. 47.10.1.2 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 56).
119. See Entick v. Carrington, (1765) Howell’s St. Tr. 1029, 1066 (K.B.) (Lord
Camden C.J.) (9By the laws of England every invasion of private property, be
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is conceived as a violation of dignitas, akin to spitting in your
face.120 To grasp this, reQall that your seQret visitor’s QonduQt is
not inconsistent with your possession of your house. Instead,
what it QontradiQts is 9your ability to be the one who deter/ines
how dthe housec will be usedZ8121 The trespass is not about the
houseKit is about you.
More astonishing, but crucial for this article, is the fact that
Roman law does not recognize a direct action for careless damage to the body of a free man.122 The precise reason given by the
Roman jurist Ulpian for this, is because dominus membrorum
suorum nemo videtur—/eaning, 9no one is to be seen as the
owner oL his li/bsZ8123 James Edelman interprets the dominus
membrorum principle to mean that property and personality are
distinQt: 9Whatever /eaning is given to 6property,’ it is inde[
pendent oL personhoodZ8124 Consequently, a 9living person Qan be
the holder of a property right but he or she cannot be the object
oL itZ8125
Kant adopts precisely this principle in the following passage:

it ever so minute, is a trespass.8); ANDREW BURROWS, PRINCIPLES OF THE
ENGLISH LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 136 (§ 2.10) (2015) (9Defamation protects reputation. Conversion protects property rights in goods. Trespass to land and private nuisance protect property rights in land.8).
120. See BUCKLAND & MCNAIR, supra note 116, at 102 (noting that trespass
is actionable only if the owner 9had expressly forbidden entry or if it was an
enclosure, such as a dwelling-house, into which everyone knew that free entry
would be forbidden. . . . But it is a wrong against personality, not against property.8); David L. Carey Miller, Public Access to Private Land in Scotland, 15
POTCHEFSTROOM ELECTRON. L.J. 119, 120 (2012) (9There is no delict of trespass
in the Romanist common law of Scotland; the landowner has an enforceable
right to require a trespasser to leave but there is no civil claim for the act of
trespass per se as there is, on the basis of the 6tort of trespass’, in English law.8).
121. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 67.
122. See BIRKS, supra note 110, at 198; ZIMMERMANN, supra note 111, at
1014N17.
123. DIG. 9.2.13.8 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 18).
124. James Edelman, Property Rights to Our Bodies and Their Products, 39
U.W. AUST. L. REV 47, 53 (2015).
125. Id. See also R v. Bentham [2005] UKHL 18 (Eng.). The defendant had
threateningly held his fingers under his jacket in the shape of a gun, for which
he was convicted possessing an imitation weapon. The conviction was reversed
on appeal, with Lord Rodger of Earlsferry invoking the dominus membrorum
principle to hold that if 9no-one is to be regarded as the owner of his own limbs
. . . [e]qually, we may be sure, no-one is to be regarded as being in possession
of his own limbs.8 Id. ¶ 4.
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An external object that in terms of its substance belongs to
someone is his property (dominium), in which all rights in this
thing inhere (as accidents of a substance) and which the owner
(dominus) can, accordingly, dispose of as he pleases (ius disponendi de re sua). But from this it follows that an object of this
sort can be only a corporeal thing (to which one has no obligation). So a man can be his own master (sui iuris) but cannot be
the owner of himself (sui dominus) (cannot dispose of himself
as he pleases). . . .126

In other words, having ownership over property means being
able to dispose of it at your pleasure. Your dignity as a person
means you cannot do this to yourselfKsay, by selling yourself
into slavery.127 Put differently, property has the aspect of being
9/ine or yours,8 whiQh /eans it is always and everywhere transmissible.128 #s Ta/es Penner eaplains, the 9very idea oL trans[
missibility is related to this idea of contingencyKwhat is yours
might as well be, and might come to be, not only mine, but his,
hers, theirs, and so onZ8129 The contingency of property in turn
means that if someone deprives you of your property, it can be
replaced. Accordingly, wrongful damage is remedied by compensation.
In contrast, personality rights cannot be disposed of in this
way—they are inalienable. Thus defined, your personality includes more than just your body but extends to all other things
whiQh Qannot beQo/e another’s, but Qan only be yoursZ Wor in[
stanQe, your reputation is 9an innate eaternal belonging Z Z Z that
Qlings to dyouc as a personZ Z Z Z8130 It is separate from you, but
126. DR 6:270, at 421.
127. See RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 135N40 (arguing that
slave contracts are juridically incoherent because they involve a person purporting to undertake an obligation to become a slave, which, as a thing, is incapable of having obligations).
128. DR 6:246, at 401. The original German reads 9mein und dein.8 See also
James W. Harris, Ownership of Land in English Law, in THE LEGAL MIND:
ESSAYS FOR TONY HONORÉ 143, 145N146 (Neil MacCormick & Peter Birks eds.,
1986) (explaining that the concept of private property in land in English law
requires three kinds of legal provisions: trespassory rules, transmission principles, and general use rules); Peter Birks, The Roman Law Concept of Dominium and the Idea of Absolute Ownership, 1985 ACTA JURIDICA 1, 20N23 (describing the necessary connection between freedom of alienation and property).
129. James Penner, On the Very Idea of Transmissible Rights, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW 244, 256 (James Penner &
Henry Smith eds., 2013).
130. DR 6:295, at 441.
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cannot be separated from you. Others may filch your good name
from you just like they might steal your purse, but unlike your
purse, your good name cannot become their good name. Similarly, the feats of bravery you accomplish in the course of your
life—your dignitas—cannot be left to your descendants like the
rest of your property.131 For this reason, Kant criticizes hereditary titles of nobility as being as silly as hereditary professorships.132 Since your personality rights cannot be taken away
from you, they can be violated only by wrongful use. Accordingly,
damage is irrelevant, and the remedy is restitution.
C. The Three Defects in the State of Nature
Ut is Qentral to Sant’s legal philosophy that none oL the rights
described in the previous section can actually be realized in a
condition of pure private interaction—the state of nature.133 This
is necessarily the case even though in such a condition persons
endowed with reason can know what proper legal relations are,
and even if they act on nothing but the best of intentions. Instead, civil government is required to address three structural
defects in the state of nature: indeterminacy, non-reciprocity,
and unilateralism. While the first two can be dealt with expeditiously, the third requires greater examination because it will
become central to the discussion of international law in Part IV.
The first defect is that rights are indeterminate without a nonpartisan judge.134 Suppose you and another person genuinely believe that a particular thing is yours. In the absence of a neutral
arbitrator, the only way to settle the dispute is by fighting. If you
win, however, that does not mean your claim was correct, but
only that you are a superior fighter. Your right remains indeterminate, even unnecessary. You might as well have taken it without making any claim of right, and another better fighter might
131. DR 6:329, at 471 (arguing that 9if an ancestor had merit he could still
not bequeath it to his descendants: they must acquire it for themselves. . . .8).
132. Id. For similar condemnations of hereditary nobility and bondage, see
PP 8:351, at 232, and DR 6:348-49, at 485N86. There is, however, one heritable
statusKcitizenship. See DR 6:343, at 482.
133. See DR 6:242, at 397 (arguing that 9a state of nature is not opposed to
social but to a civil condition, since there can be society in a state of nature,
but no civil society (which secured what is mine by public laws).8); DR 6:256,
at 409 (arguing that rights to have external things as one’s own are possible
only in a civil condition in a lawful condition under an authority giving laws
publicly).
134. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 168N72.
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do likewise to you.135 You therefore remain in a barbaric condition where might determines right. The solution is a judiciary
that issues binding decisions publicly and systematicallyKthat
is, in open court and according to principles applicable to all.136
The second defect is nonreciprocity.137 As a person endowed
with reason, you know that you must not use violence against
others, but you are prevented from promising them that you will
not do this because you cannot be sure they will do the same for
you. If you disarm unilaterally you will effectively surrender
yourself to the mercy of others. This is inconsistent with your
dignity, and therefore not just imprudent but immoral.138 The
solution to this prisoner’s dile//a is an eaeQutive with a /o[
nopoly on enforcement of determined rights, to be exercised,
once again, publicly and systematically.139
The third defect, and the one most important to this article,
relates to the acquisition of property and directly contradicts the
natural law theories "envenisti relies uponZ :peQiLiQally, Sant’s
theory of original acquisition stands in particular contrast to
LoQHe’s theory, as eapressed in the following canonical passage:

135. See Jeremy Waldron, Kant’s Legal Positivism, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1535,
1539N40 (1996) (9The point of using force in the name of justice is to assure
people of that to which they are entitled. But if force is being used to further
contradictory ends, then its connection with assurance is ruptured. In such a
situation, force is being used simply to represent the vehemence with which
competing opinions about justice are held, and this use of force may well be
worse than force not being put to the service of justice at all.8).
136. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Private Law and Public Right, 61 U. TORONTO
L.J. 191, 197 (2011) (9The adjudication of liability manifests both publicness
and systematicity. First, a court exercises its authority in a public manner by
exhibiting justifications for liability that are accessible to public reason. . . .
Second, the court’s decision partakes of the systematicity of the entire legal
order.8); RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 169N74.
137. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 159N68.
138. Id. at 161N66. See DR 6:307, at 452 (arguing that 9[n]o one is bound to
refrain from encroaching on what another possesses if the other gives him no
equal assurance that he will observe the same restraint towards him. No one,
therefore, need wait until he has learned by bitter experience of the other’s
contrary disposition. . . .8).
139. See RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 165 (arguing that
9[o]nly a 9common and powerful will8 can 9provide this assurance8 and can provide everyone with systematic incentives in relation to the possessions of others,8 and describing that systematicity as lying in an assurance that rights will
not be erased by others’ wrongs, and that violations will be made 9prospectively
pointless.8) (citing DR 6:256, at 409).
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Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all
men, yet every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labour of his body and
the work of his hands we may say are properly his. Whatsoever,
then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and
left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removed from the common state Nature placed it
in, it hath by this labour something annexed to it that excludes
the common right of other men. For this 9labour8 being the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have
a right to what that is once joined to, at least where there is
enough, and as good as left in common for others.140

;eQall that LoQHe’s notion oL leaving enough and as good in
Qo//on Lor others plays a pro/inent role in "envenisti’s Justi[
fication of the altruistic duties of sovereigns. Of interest to this
article, however, is LoQHe’s idea oL /iaing one’s labour as a Lirst
step to enclosing property, which has given rise to a number of
well-known difficulties.141 Can an undertaker acquire property
in the corpses she embalms, like a mechanic acquiring a lien over
the cars she is fixing?142 If your labour is your 9un*uestionable8
property, does that mean contracts for service are actually conveyances of property?143 The most incisive and memorable critique comes from Jim Harris, who argued that Locke had com/itted a 9speQtaQular non sequitur8 in the Lirst sentenQe oL the
cited passage by suggesting that persons must necessarily own
themselves if they are not slaves owned by others. Instead, Harris invokes the dominus membrorum principle to argue that,
9dLcro/ the LaQt that nobody owns me if I am not a slave, it simply
140. LOCKE, supra note 36, § 27.
141. See JAMES W. HARRIS, PROPERTY AND JUSTICE 184N88 (1996). For a celebrated critique from a scholar generally sympathetic to Locke, see Jeremy Waldron, Two Worries About Mixing One’s Labour, 33 PHIL. Q. 37 (1983).
142. See Haynes’s Case (1614) 77 Eng. Rep. 1389 (KB) (Sir Edward Coke C.J.)
(holding a grave robber liable in theft with respect to winding sheet, but not
the corpse, because there is no property in a dead body).
143. HARRIS, supra note 141, at 191N94. For an example of the results of conflating contractual and proprietary rights, see Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S.
45, 53 (1905) (9The general right to make a contract in relation to his business
is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution. . . . Under that provision no State can deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right to purchase or to sell labor is part of the liberty protected by this amendment, unless
there are circumstances which exclude the right.8).
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does not follow that I must own myself. Nobody at all owns me,
not even /eZ8144
In contrast to Locke, Kant separates body and property by distinguishing between innate and acquired rights to objects: an
9innate right is that which belongs to everyone by nature, independently of any act that would establish a right; an acquired
right is that Lor whiQh suQh an aQt is re*uiredZ8145 Your body,
reputation, and honor are innately yours. You do not have to account for how you came to possess them because they cannot
have been in anyone else’s possession LirstZ Un Qontrast, your
right to your purse is an acquired right because, if history had
taken a different course, it could very easily have been someone
else’sZ146
With this in mind, the first step to acquiring an external object
in the state of nature is by engulfing it with an innate object,
/uQh liHe Vrotius’s notion oL bodily oQQupying a theatre seatZ147
When you wrap your fingers around an apple, the only way another person can get to it and try to make it theirs is to prise off
your fingers, which you can resist because your fingers are innately yours.148 This, however, is not enough for your control of
the obJeQt to a/ount to 9ownership8 beQause, the moment you let
go, anyone can take it. This is where the trouble starts for Grotius’ theatre seat /etaphorKyour claim to the seat lasts only so
long as you sit there. Others cannot oust you because this involves touching you. The moment you leave, however, another
may grab your place.149 A property right entails more than just
a right not to be assaulted while occupying the thingKit means
144. HARRIS, supra note 141, at 196.
145. DR 6:237, at 393.
146. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 59N60.
147. DR 6:263, at 415 (9The only condition under which a taking possession
(apprehensio), beginning to hold (possessionis physicae) a corporeal thing in
space, conforms with . . . [external freedom] is the first taking possession (prior
apprehensio), which is an act of choice.8). See also DR 6:268, at 419 (9We have
found the manner of acquisition in the empirical conditions of taking possession (apprehensio), joined with the will to have the external object as one’s
own.8).
148. DR 6:247-48, at 402. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 94.
149. Harris illustrates this with a joke about a Home Counties man attending
a cricket match in Yorkshire. Having left his hat on his seat in order to get a
drink, he returns to find his place taken by a local. Upon protesting, he is told:
9Nay, lad, up here it’s bums that keep seats, not hats!8 HARRIS, supra note 141,
at 214.
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being able to exclude others from the thing, even when you are
not in physical possession of it.150 Such exclusion, however, cannot be justified by simply ensuring others have enough and as
good left for their needs. If you claim a right to exclude others
from a certain plot of land because you have grown enough apples on it to feed everyone, they may justifiably retort that they
prefer oranges and, more importantly, that it was not for you to
decide that they must have apples.
This reveals a deficiency in Grotian and Lockean natural law
theories of original acquisition. Merely wrapping your fingers
around the apple does not change the legal rights and obligations of othersKthey are already under an obligation not to interfere with your person. Claiming property in it does change the
legal rights and obligations of othersKthey are now obligated
not to interfere with it even after you let go. No private person
outside oL a LiduQiary Qan Qhange another’s legal position, and
the encloser is certainly not a fiduciary of the excluded. Harris
accordingly concludes that the Grotian-LoQHean approaQh 9suL[
Lers Lro/ the Lollowing Latal Llaw8: it 9presupposes a unilateral
power to Qreate new trespassory obligationsZ8151 Such obligations
can be created only 9o/nilaterally8Kthat is, by the whole of society coming together as one to back up your claim to exclude
others from the thing, even when you no longer physically occupy it.152 The solution is to postulate an institution capable of
deLining the 9signs8 we /ust give one another to de/onstrate
taking control of a thing with an intention to continue controlling it.153 There is no property without law. In order to bind everyone, the law must be made by an institution acting publicly
and systematically as the voice of the united will of all the persons bound. In other words, you need a representative legislature.154

150. DR 6:247, at 402 (9I shall not call an apple mine because I have it in my
hand (possess it physically), but only if I can say that I possess it even though
I have put it down, no matter where.8).
151. HARRIS, supra note 141, at 202.
152. See RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 157N58.
153. DR 6:265, at 417.
154. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 157 (9[M]y appropriation
can only change your legal situation if everyone, including you, has conferred
a power on me to appropriate. My act of appropriation is thus a unilateral exercise of an omnilateral power, rather than a unilateral act . . . my act genuinely binds them only when the general will has authorized it.8).
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D. Legislating With Respect to Property and Personality
Once the executive, judiciary, and legislature are set up, the
rightful condition is complete.155 The state is 9Qonstituted,8 and
you are required to enter it, not because it is so advantageous
that it would be irrational to remain outside but because it is an
offer you cannot refuse. Your consent is mandatory. If you remain outside, this means you are reserving for yourself the opportunity to use violence against others as and when you please.
Others need notKindeed must notKabide this. The innate right
to freedom of all persons means that others can compel you to
enter into a condition with them where they will be assured of
their equal freedom. Put differently, authority is necessary for
freedom; you become free by submitting to authority.156 If you
choose not to submit, that makes you unfree, which in turn
means you can be forcedKforced to be free. Law and authority
seem incompatible with freedom only if freedom is understood
as license; that is, the ability to do whatever one pleases without
constraint. If, however, freedom is understood as independence
from domination by others, it becomes obvious that it cannot exist without political institutions vested with the authority to use
force.
The rightful condition, however, consolidates and preserves innate and acquired rights under a system of lawfully constituted
authority as property and personality rights.157 To recall the previous section, property is always transmissible, and personality
is always inalienable. This, however, is not to deny the existence
of so-Qalled 9inalienable8 Lor/s oL property suQh as Lee tails,
155. DR 6:316, at 459. See also RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13,
at 173 (demonstrating the interlocking manner in which the 9legislature must
authorize all acts that change, enforce, or demarcate rights; the executive must
enforce rights in accordance with law, and the judiciary must decide disputes
and authorize remedies, again in accordance with law.8).
156. See DR 6:316, at 459 (9[O]ne cannot say: the human being in a state has
sacrificed a part of his innate outer freedom for the sake of an end, but rather,
he has relinquished entirely his wild, lawless freedom in order to find his freedom as such undiminished, in a dependence upon laws, that is, in a rightful
condition, since this dependence arises from his own lawgiving will.8).
157. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 157 (arguing that while
9people might come to recognize each other’s claims to property or under contracts without an omnilateral authorization . . . whether or not they accept
them depends on the matter of their choices.8 Instead, only under a rightful
condition do any rules or dispute resolution procedures possess 9genuine authority.8).
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praedial servitudes, or usufructs. Rather, transmissibility
si/ply /eans that 9the sa/e Qonstraints on the QonduQt oL oth[
ers pass over to the new owner intaQtZ8158 Contrariwise, neither
does the inalienability of personality mean that you are not allowed to donate your kidney. Rather, it means that you cannot
sell your kidney as if it were your property, and that stringent
legal protections have to be in place to ensure that your decision
to alienate it is not the product of domination. This is perhaps
best illustrated by the infamous passages in the Doctrine of
Right dealing with sexual intercourse. Kant begins by observing
that beQause a 9hu/an being Qannot have property in himself,
much less in another person,8 /aHing use oL another’s body with[
out inLringing upon their dignity re*uires a 9/orally neQessary8
purpose such as procreation, rather than plain enjoyment of another 9as a thingZ8159 =therwise, sea beQo/es a 9QannibalistiQ8
Lor/ oL 9use by eaQh oL the seaual organs oL another, dsuQh thatc
each is actually a consumable thing (res fungibilis) with respect
to the other, so that if one were to make oneself such a thing by
contract, the QontraQt would be Qontrary to lawZ8160 Most legal
systems the reader may be familiar with will not pursue these
legal presQriptions to the eatre/eZ Revertheless, /uQh oL Sant’s
rationale for rejecting of commercial contracts for prostitution is
reflected in developed legal regimes governing sex work or bodily
alienations such as euthanasia and organ transplantation.
Where we permit such bodily alienations, we generally prohibit
them being carried out on commercial terms, and even if we do,
we take great pains to ensure that they are the result of genuine
and informed choice, rather than vulnerability and exploitation.
In short, transmissibility and inalienability mean that property and personality raise exactly opposite problems for lawmakersZ #s Tapa PalliHathayil notes, 9dwce need rules Lor property
acquisition, which involve acquiring a right and hence imposing
obligations on others, and we need rules for bodily alienation,
158. Arthur Ripstein, Property and Sovereignty: How to Tell the Difference,
18 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 243, 253 (2017) [hereinafter Ripstein, Property
and Sovereignty]. See also Birks, supra note 128, at 20N21 (arguing that 9it is
not nonsense to speak of ownership of a usufruct, a right definitionally temporary and inalienable. If the law declared sheep inalienable, the conclusion
would have to be that you could not own sheep but only 9sheepright8:
9sheepright8 would be definitionally inalienable, whereas sheep are not.8).
159. DR 6:359, at 495.
160. DR 6:359-60, at 494N95.
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which involve renouncing a right and hence relieving others of
obligationsZ8161 This difference in treatment reflects the deeper
QonviQtion that personality rights are not aQtually rights oL 9own[
ership8 at allZ =ne Qannot be both the obJeQt and the subJeQt oL
property rights. Nobody owns you, not even you.
III. PUBLIC RIGHT: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY
This Part of the article deals with sovereignty. Notwithstanding the focus on public law, private law themes of damage, injury, and fiduciary relations continue to play a central role. In
particular, this Part is in agreement with Benvenisti in understanding the state as a fiduciary. It will be demonstrated firstly
that the state is a person and secondly that, as the public fiduciary, the state has obligations to provide its subJeQts with 9publiQ
goodsZ8
A. The Separate, Public Person of the State
Once the state is constituted, the question arises as to whether
it is by nature a 9person8 or a 9thingZ8 While trained by long tra[
dition to call it a person, international lawyers differ significantly in what they mean by this usage. According to the standard liberal view, it tends to mean that the state acts as a placeholder Lor a QolleQtivity oL natural 9Llesh-and-blood8 individualsZ
For instance, in his defense of private law analogies to model
legal relations between states, Hersch Lauterpacht observes
that 9dtche analogyKnay, the essential identityKof rules governing the conduct of states and of individuals is not asserted for
the reason that states are like individuals; it is due to the fact
states are composed oL individual hu/an beingsZ Z Z Z8162 Likewise, "envenisti desQribes the state as 9not more than the aggregate oL individuals who deLine their and others’ property rights
through the politiQal proQessZ8163
161. Japa Pallikkathayil, Persons and Bodies, in FREEDOM AND FORCE:
ESSAYS ON KANT’S LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 35, 50 (Sari Kisilevsky & Martin J. Stone
eds., 2017).
162. Hersch Lauterpacht, The Grotian Tradition in International Law, 23
BR. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 27 (1946).
163. Eyal Benvenisti, Sovereignty and the Politics of Property, 18
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 447, 448 (2017). See LOCKE, supra note 36, § 120
(9By the same Act therefore, whereby any one unites his Person, which was
before free, to any Commonwealth, by the same he unites his Possessions,
which were before free, to it also; and they become, both of them, Person and
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On such a view, the state and its subjects are one and the
same. As Lauterpacht explains:
[B]ehind the mystical, impersonal, and therefore necessarily
irresponsible personality of the metaphysical state there are
the actual subjects of rights and duties, namely, individual human beings . . . [t]he individual is the ultimate unit of all law,
international and municipal, in the double sense that the obligations of international law are ultimately addressed to him
and that the development, the well-being, and the dignity of
the individual human being are a matter of direct concern to
international law.164

BeQause the state’s personhood is si/ply an aggregation oL the
personhoods oL the individual hu/an beings who are the 9ulti[
/ate unit oL all law,8 the Lor/er /ay presu/ably be piQHed
apart and rearranged if conducive to the benefit of the latter.165
Or, in GeofLrey Howe’s ini/itable phrase: 9:overeignty is not
virginity, whiQh you either have or you don’tZ ;ather, it is liHe Z
. . [a] bundle of sticks, and the subject of a never-ending series of
transactions between nation-states, handing over some things
and taHing baQH othersZ8166
On this notion of the state as a collectivity of individuals, it
would seem that sovereign or public obligations are in essence
aQtually rights and obligations operating 9hori`ontally8 between
private parties. For instance, Henry Shue describes states as
9/ediating8 institutions Lor 9perLeQting8 pre-political rights and
duties between private individuals to guarantee 9a Lew basiQs Z Z
Z when helpless to seQure the/ Lor dthe/selvesc,8167 and that
9negative8 rights Qreate Qorresponding duties on all persons pub[
liQ and private, while 9positive duties need to be divided and as[
signed a/ong bearers in so/e reasonable wayZ8168 This approach
of collapsing all public rights and obligations into claims arising
Possession, subject to the Government and Dominion of the Commonwealth,
as long as it hath a being.8).
164. Lauterpacht, supra note 162, at 27.
165. See Peters, supra note 58, at 534N55.
166. Geoffrey Howe, Sovereignty and Interdependence: Britain’s Place in the
World, 66 INT’L AFF. 675, 679 (1990) (explicitly likening sovereignty to freehold
real estate ownership in English law). See also Lauterpacht, supra note 162,
at 29N30 (9The very notion of sovereignty, which Grotius conceived, like property, as dominion held under law, helped to deprive it of the character of absoluteness and indivisibility.8).
167. Henry Shue, Mediating Duties, 98 ETHICS 687, 687 (1988).
168. Id. at 690.
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essentially in private relationships seems unable to account for
certain important intuitions about the nature of human rights
claims. For instance, if your neighbor were to drag you into her
dungeon and waterboard you, we would say that this constitutes
a tort against you, rather than a violation of your human rights.
The latter occurs only if her conduct is not prevented or redressed by appropriate civil and criminal legislation, adjudication, and enforcement. Human rights violations seem to require
more than just private moral failures. Instead, they imply a public failure by your entire community. This quality of publicness,
however, cannot be accounted for as an aggregation of many different horizontal claims against each and every individual community member, like a mass tort. Rather, it has the characteristic of a failure by someone whose job it is to take care of youKa
fiduciary. This is reflected in legal practice, where there are vanishingly few judicial decisions or constitutional provisions asserting the horizontality of human rights between private personsKinstead, the overwhelming trend being to find them as
possessing 9indireQt8 hori`ontal eLLeQt in private legal relations,
on the grounds that the state must be presumed to have posited
the private law in a manner consistent with its human rights
and constitutional obligations.169
There are other areas of legal practice similarly irreconcilable
with the conception of the state as an aggregation of individuals.
Consider the example of a sovereign debt. Ordinarily, an unsecured debt is a contractual obligation that expires with the
debtor, and which cannot be passed on to her heirs. If the state
is not more than the collection of citizens who make it up, a sovereign debt ought logically to expire with the last citizen alive at
the time it was incurred. This is obviously not the case. Instead,
states are liable for their debts no matter how many generations
it takes to pay them off.170
169. For readings critical of this trend, see Aoife Nolan, Holding Non-State
Actors to Account for Constitutional Economic and Social Rights Violations:
Experiences and Lessons from South Africa and Ireland, 12 INT’L J. CONST. L.
61, 65, 88, passim (2014); Stu Woolman, The Amazing, Vanishing Bill of
Rights, 124 S. AFR. L.J. 762, 763 (2007) (observing the South African Constitutional Court’s preference for conform-interpretation of common law and statutes with constitutional rights and 9persistent refusal to engage in the direct
application of the Bill of Rights,8 notwithstanding explicit textual grant in §
8(2)N8(3) of the South African Constitution).
170. See Frederick W. Maitland, The Crown as Corporation, in MAITLAND:
STATE, TRUST AND CORPORATION 32, 39N40 (David Runciman ed., 2003).
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In contrast to the view of the state as an aggregation of its
people, Kant recognizes the state as a distinct moral person,
with a life and purposes separate from those of its subjects and
officials.171 For this reason, Kant argues that plundering the
population oL a deLeated ene/y state is prohibited beQause 9to
force individual persons to give up their belongings . . . would be
robbery, since it was not the conquered people who waged the
war; rather, the state under whose rule they lived waged the war
through the peopleZ Z Z Z8172 Attributability and responsibilityK
the defining characteristics of personhoodKbelong not to the
people, but to the separate person of their state. This notion of
separate personality is also reLleQted in ;onald fworHin’s /eta[
phor of an orchestra, which is much more than just an aggregation of musicians playing particular notes on particular instruments at particular times.173 Unstead, it Qonstitutes 9a personi[
fied unit of agency in which [the musicians] no longer figure as
individuals but as Qo/ponentsZ Z Z Z8174 As such, Dworkin argues
that 9dwchen an integrated community exists, the statements citizens make within it about its success or failure are not simply
statistical summaries of their own successes or failures as individuals. An integrated community has interests and concerns of
its ownKits own liLe to leadZ8175
Thus, on the republican conception, the state is a person in its
own right, possessed of a life and purposes distinct from its individual subjects and officials. Its sole purpose is to provide a condition where no member of the political community is subject to
171. For a different view, see Fernando R. Tesón, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 53, 70N71 (1992) (arguing that the 9state .
. . does not acquire moral value greater than its components8, and that the
9state as moral person is just an analogy. . . .8). Tesón derives this conclusion
from PP 8:344, at 318, which he concedes 9seems to conceive of the state in a
holistic way as a moral person. . . .8 Tesón, supra note 171, at 70.
172. DR 6:348, at 485.
173. RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EQUALITY 226 (2000).
174. Id.
175. Id. The strong personification of the state is in fact the source of Ronald
Dworkin’s interpretive principle of 9integrity,8 understood as the coherence
over time and space of a community’s scheme of justice. Dworkinian integrity
draws its strength from the essentially Kantian idea that a person 9cannot
treat himself as the author of a collection of laws that are inconsistent in principle. . . .8 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 189 (1986). Dworkin never quite
explains how the orders of another person, no matter how well-integrated, can
count as self-legislation. The fiduciary notion of authority closes that gap.
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the will of another. To this end, it wields authority over subjectsKthat is, claims an entitlement to determine their legal
rights and duties, to bind them by its pronouncements. This
means that the state is simply an extension of the private law
concept of a fiduciary.176 Since it possesses its subjects, it may
not also use them. Whatever decisions it makes in respect of its
subjects must be consistent with purposes they could have set
for themselves. Just as a beneficiary requires the intercession of
her trustee in order to exercise her rights, say, in a piece of property, neither can an individual enjoy the freedom that is her innate right without the state. Equally, just as the private law contains a set of principles to ensure that private fiduciary relationships do not degenerate into exploitation, public law contains a
set of principles to ensure that authority does not degenerate
into domination: human rights.177 Human rights are neither entitlements to the satisfaction of a set of basic interests, nor are
they the fount of the entire global legal order. Instead, their sole
purpose is to ensure that those who possess us neither use us,
nor permit others to use and possess us.
Accordingly, this article is in agreement with Benvenisti’s Qon[
ception of sovereigns as fiduciaries. It is submitted, however,
that this commitment necessarily requires the state-fiduciary to
be a separate person from its subjects-beneficiaries. In Peter
176. See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY
111N12 (2011) (arguing, from the premise that no one may be a judge in their
own cause, that private parties are juridically incapable of authority, thus
making them reliant upon the state to provide legal order, thereby making the
state a fiduciary of them.). See also Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814, 820
(1879) (9The power of governing is a trust committed by the people to the government. . . . The people, in their sovereign capacity, have established their
agencies for the preservation of the public health and the public morals, and
the protection of public and private rights.8); Black River Regulating Dist. v.
Adirondack League Club, 121 N.E.2d 428, 433 (N.Y. 1984) (holding that 9the
power conferred by the Legislature is akin to that of a public trust to be exercised not for the benefit or at the will of the trustee but for the common good.8).
177. See EVAN J. CRIDDLE & EVAN FOX-DECENT, FIDUCIARIES OF HUMANITY:
HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW CONSTITUTES AUTHORITY 106 (2016) (arguing that
9[h]uman rights protect individuals against state domination and instrumentalization by entitling all persons to be treated in certain ways by public institutions as a matter of rights. Human rights are thus claim-rights against public authorities.8). See generally id. at ch. 3. See also David L. Attanasio, The
State Obligation to Protect, chs. 3, 6 (2015) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of California, Los Angeles) (arguing that positive human rights obligations can only be accounted on fiduciary principles).
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"irHs’s eaQellent phrase, LiduQiary obligations are 9inseverably
Qo/pound8178: they envisage one personKthe fiduciaryKtaking
9positive steps in the interest of another8179Kthe beneficiary. If
states-fiduciaries were one and the same as their subjects-beneficiaries, we would have no criteria by which to judge and critiQi`e the Lor/er’s relationship with the latterZ #ny subJeQts-beneficiaries disagreeing with the directives of the state-fiduciary
would effectively be contradicting themselves.
For this reason, it would be deeply destructive of the human
rights practice if human interests in, say, security could oust
sovereign personality as the organizing principle of public law.
This was demonstrated in the English case of A v. Home Secretary, whiQh involved the legality oL 9Qontrol orders,8 whiQh Hept
under indefinite detention foreign nationals suspected of terrorist links, but who could not be deported to their home countries
because they risked being tortured.180 The key question for the
House oL Lords was whether there was a 9publiQ e/ergenQy
threatening the life oL the nation8181 JustiLying a 9derogation8
from the rights to liberty and trial guaranteed by the U.K. Human Rights Act of 1998 and the ECHR.182 In his speech denying
the legality of the control orders, Lord Hoffmann observed that:
The 9nation8 is a soQial organism, living in its territory (in this
case, the United Kingdom) under its own form of government
and subject to a system of laws which expresses its own political and moral values . . . The life of the nation is not coterminous with the lives of its people. The nation, its institutions
and values, endure through generations. In many important
respects, England is the same nation as it was at the time of
the first Elizabeth or the Glorious Revolution. The Armada
178. Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obligation, 34 ISRAEL L. REV. 3,
33 (2000).
179. Id. at 37N38. (Emphasis added).
180. A and others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department; X and another v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, [2004] UKHL 56 (appeal
taken from Eng.).
181. See Lawless v. Ireland, (1961) 1 Eur. H.R. Rep. 15, ¶ 28 (defining the
phrase as 9an exceptional situation of crisis or emergency which affects the
whole population and constitutes a threat to the organised life of the community of which the State is composed.8).
182. Human Rights Act, 1998, c. 42 (U.K.); European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213
U.N.T.S. 221. The Human Rights Act incorporates the treaty protections under
the ECHR into domestic British law.
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threatened to destroy the life of the nation, not by loss of life in
battle, but by subjecting English institutions to the rule of
Spain and the Inquisition. The same was true of the threat
posed to the United Kingdom by Nazi Germany in the Second
World War.183

Lord Hoffmann added that he was willing to accept the Home
:eQretary’s sub/issions that there were Qredible threats oL ter[
rorist plots, and that he 9did not underesti/ate the ability oL La[
natiQal groups oL terrorists to Hill and destroy8 individual sub[
jects.184 Nevertheless, this in itself was insuLLiQient to 9threaten
the liLe oL the nationZ8185 Unstead, the 9real threat to the liLe oL
the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its
traditional laws and political values, [came] not from terrorism
but Lro/ laws suQh8 as the Qontrol orders.186
In exactly this sense, Kant remarks that people who have
united themselves into a society and therefore share a general
will must regard the state as existing in perpetuity.187 The state
lives and dies by its fiduciary purpose alone: its immortality is
9a pure nor/ative re*uire/ent, grounded in its ability to speaH
and aQt Lor everyone8 notwithstanding Qhanges in /e/ber[
ship.188 Thus, contrary to a prominent trend in contemporary human rights literature,189 a very strong personification of the
183. A v. Home Secretary, [2004] UKHL, ¶ 91.
184. Id. ¶ 96.
185. Id.
186. Id. See also Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency, 9 Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A), at 40, OEA/ser.L./VI/111.9, doc. 13 (1987) (noting that armed conflict may justify a declaration of a state of emergency only if finite in duration,
thus prohibiting open-ended emergency rule); CRIDDLE & FOX-DECENT, supra
note 177, at 136N37 (arguing that 9terrorist violence will rarely justify a state’s
recourse to emergency powers8 because a 9threat to the organized life of the
community8 lies in the 9disrupt[ion of] the state’s ability to guarantee its subjects’ secure and equal freedom8 rather than the danger to the lives of individual subjects).
187. DR 6:326, at 468.
188. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 272N73.
189. See John Tasioulas, Towards a Philosophy of Human Rights, 65
CURRENT LEG. PROBS. 1, 24 (2012) (observing and approving the fact that 9the
language of human rights is often deployed by those implacably opposed to the
state, or to its assertions of legitimacy. . . .8); Peters, supra note 58, at 514
(arguing that post-Cold War developments in international law 9definitely
ousted the principle of sovereignty from its position as the Letztbegründung
(first principle) of international law8 and that the doctrine of sovereign personality 9remains foundational only in a historical or ontological sense. . . .8) See
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state is not only compatible with the human rights practice but
essential to it.190 In particular, claims of positive or socioecono/iQ rights are in no way 9basiQ8 or 9Lunda/ental8 but are in
fact the most extravagant demands anyone could ever make as
a matter of right, such that no private individual could ever be
held to such obligations, much less allowed the awesome powers
they come with. These can be borne and wielded only by one indivisible personKthe state.191
Interpreting human rights and sovereignty along such republican lines allows one to situate the human rights practice neatly
alongside the rule of law and democracy and to picture these as
integrated and mutually supporting, rather than as incompatible and opposed to one another. That said, it contradicts a central orthodoxy of the human rights movementKthat they are
9pre-politiQal,8 or held purely in virtue oL being hu/anZ192 Rather, human rights are fully political and are held in virtue of a
very particular status; that of being a subject.193 This explains

also Louis Henkin, That S Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human
Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 (1999) (arguing that 9a state is not
a person, but an abstractionKand its relation to other abstractions, such as
the governments which represent states, has inevitably brought distortion and
confusion.8).
190. Hélène Ruiz Fabri, Human Rights and State Sovereignty : Have the
Boundaries been Significantly Redrawn?, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERVENTION,
AND THE USE OF FORCE 33, 41 (Philip Alston & Euan MacDonald eds., 2008)
(arguing that the 9human rights discourse cannot afford to treat the state as
nothing more than an oppressive structure to be opposed wherever possible8
and that the 9dilution of [State] power does not automatically correspond to
improvements in the level of actual human rights protections. . . .8).
191. Id. at 84 (arguing that 9[h]uman rights are, in effect, structurally dependent on the existence of an authority capable of guaranteeing them; in the
absence of any 9horizontal effect8 of these rules (which would represent one
further step on the path to their objectification), the subjects of the obligations
both to respect and protect them are states.8).
192. See, e.g., A. JOHN SIMMONS, JUSTIFICATION AND LEGITIMACY: ESSAYS ON
RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS 185 (2001) (9[H]uman rights are rights possessed by
all human beings (at all times and in all places), simply in virtue of their humanity . . . [as] natural rights that are innate and that cannot be lost (that is,
that cannot be given away, forfeited, or taken away).8); Charles Beitz, Human
Rights and the Law of Peoples, in THE ETHICS OF ASSISTANCE: MORALITY AND
THE DISTANT NEEDY 193, 196 (Deen K. Chatterjee ed., 2004) (describing Simmons’s position as 9orthodox.8).
193. See Lord Dyson M.R., The Extraterritorial Application of the European
Convention on Human Rights: Essex Lecture 2014, at 5 (Jan. 30, 2014),
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the discussion on human rights jurisdiction in Part I, and in particular, the claim that a state may drop bombs upon distant
strangers without them having even the beginnings of a human
rights claim. Consider in this regard the discussion towards the
end of the Al-Skeini decision, where the ECtHR considered a hypothetical scenario in which soldiers cross over into foreign territory and shoot civilians there.194 While earlier decisions suggested obiter that those circumstances gave rise to human rights
jurisdiction,195 the Al-Skeini court instead opined that jurisdiction could arise only if the civilians were first ordered into a van,
taken to a nearby cave, and then shot.196 Such a position would
be absurd and outrageous on the understanding of the human
rights practice as advanced by BenvenistiKthat is, as imposing
upon states an obligation to advance human welfare wherever
they have the capacity to do so.
It makes sense, however, on the notion of human rights as public fiduciary claims made not against those wielding mere power,
but against those wielding authority.197 If you are merely shot by
marauding soldiers or killed in a drone strike, you have only
been affected, albeit extremely adversely, as if by a gunman. If,
however, you were ordered into a van and transported to a cave
before being shot, you can say that for that brief duration, you
were being governed. This is why the threshold for human rights
jurisdiction is described in Al-Skeini as 9authority and Qontrol8
rather than 9power or eLLeQtive QontrolZ8198 Only under the for-

https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/JCO/Documents/Speeches/lord-dyson-speech-extraterritorial-reachechr-300114.pdf _9The reason dhu/an rightsc JurisdiQtion has been established
is because there is a relationship between the State and an individual that can
and should entail a responsibility on the part of the State to observe that individual’s hu/an rightsZ The Qategories oL eaQeptional QirQu/stanQes are manifestations of jurisdiction but they are not the reason Lor JurisdiQtionZ8^Z
194. Al-Skeini, (2011) 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶¶ 133N40.
195. Issa v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 567, ¶ 71 (2004); Pad
and others v. Turkey, App. No. 60167/00, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 54 (June 28, 2007);
Isaak v. Turkey, App. No. 44587/98, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 19 (Sept. 28, 2006).
196. Al-Skeini, (2011) 53 Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 136.
197. Besson, supra note 75, at 875N77 (arguing that a claim of authority,
whiQh she Qalls 9nor/ative guidanQe,8 is the Hey 9Qonstitutive ele/ent8 oL hu[
man rights jurisdiction).
198. This is the preferred formula of the UN Human Rights Committee
(HRC). See UN Hum. Rts. Comm., General Comment No. 31: Nature of the
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, ¶ 10 U.N.
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mer condition can claims of human rights be made. This conLir/s Hannah #rendt’s presQient Qriti*ue oL the 7fH;, in which
she observed that 9we are not born e*ual% we beQo/e e*ual as
members of a group on the strength of our decision to guarantee
ourselves /utually e*ual rightsZ8199 This, however, leads to a
paradox where 9the loss oL hu/an rights Z Z Z QoinQides with the
instant when a person becomes a human being in general . . .
representing nothing but his own absolutely unique individuality which, deprived of expression within and action upon a com/on world, loses all signiLiQanQeZ8200 In the state of nature, no
one can count on any rights whatsoever.
B. Public Goods: Ripstein’s Roads
A political community needs certain things in order to ensure
the independence of all its members, which cannot be held or
provided privately. As the public fiduciary charged with ensuring the dignity of its subjects, the state must provide them.
These are public goods.
Contemporary legal discourse overwhelmingly understands
public goods in substantive economic terms as utility-enhancing
things that are nonrivalrous and nonexcludable, leaving private
persons no incentive to produce them, but instead to free ride. In
contrast, using roads as an archetype, Ripstein provides a definition of public goods in legal terms as things that must be provided publicly to ensure the freedom of all members of the political community.201 Ripstein offers the following thought experiment: Imagine that all the land in your community was completely under private ownership, such that there was no way of
traveling from one part of the territory to another without the
permission of individual landowners. Under such conditions,
your ability to communicate with others would be rendered completely subject to the pleasure of your neighbors. Welfare considerations are irrelevant: your house may be so vast or your curiosity so stunted that you are happy never to step outside.202 In-

Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (2004). HRC General Comments are not legally
binding.
199. HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 301 (2d ed. 1958).
200. Id. at 302.
201. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at ch. 8.
202. Id. at 248.
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stead, it is the very LaQt that you need your neighbor’s permission to leave your land, or to be let back in if you have left, which
constitutes the affront to your dignity.203
You would have no recourse against your neighbors in private
law, for they neither damage your property nor injure you. In no
way do they wrongfully deprive you of the land that you have,
because by refusing to let you cross their land, they merely use
their land in a manner which makes yours unsuitable for your
desired projects.204 Nor do they wrongfully use your land, so long
as they do not set foot on it. Why then should you worry? Because
in this Qondition, 9somebody else gets to deQide8 Qountless QruQial
aspects of your life, such as whether or when you can step outside, or whom you are allowed to associate with, as if you were a
serf under their lordship.205 You will not be the master of the
land. Rather, the land will be the master of you.206 This systemic
problem cannot be solved by merely bundling rights of private
ownership with easements of necessity in favor of all other persons, for that would render landowners subject to the whims of
anyone who might want to cross it. They would, for instance,
have to seek the individual consent of everyone in the community before they could, say, build an extension.207 Instead, the solution is for the state to build and maintain a system of publicly
administered spaces for all persons to travel uponKroads.
Thus described, roads, highways, and waterways are designated as public goods not because they facilitate the substantive
good of navigability,208 but to ensure that no person will be made
203. Id. at 247N48.
204. Id. at 245N46.
205. Id. at 246. See id. at 248 (arguing that 9the right to be your own master
is contrastive: no other person is your master. A neighbor who is entitled to
decide who you can associate with would be your master.8).
206. Consider the glebae adscriptiKa category of slave 9adscripted8 to the
land in that they were forbidden to leave it, and title to them ran with the land.
Kant mentions them twice in the Doctrine of Right, in the first of which he
describes them as 9grunduntertänig8Kthat is, as 9subservient to the land.8 DR
6:324, at 466, and 6:330, at 471.
207. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 252.
208. Under Roman law, interdicts could be issued preventing work from being done on public rivers regardless of whether they were navigable. DIG.
43.13.1.2N3 (Ulpian, Ad Edictum 68). See also Van Niekerk & Union Government (Minister of Lands) v. Carter (1917) A.D. 359, 373 (Supreme Court of Appeal) (S. Afr.) (Innes C.J.) (observing that 9[s]o far as their public character was
concerned, the Roman law drew no distinction in principle between navigable
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systematically dependent upon the arbitrary choices of others.
The same rationale applies to requirements of socioeconomic justice, such as the provision of adequate housing and basic education.209 A homeless person may not sleep upon the property of
another without their permission, nor may she sleep on the
streets without being a public nuisance. Illiterate people tend to
be systematically dependent on those who can read. Thus, unless housing and education are made available and affordable,
persons are put in a position where they are systematically dependent upon the kindness of others. Nobody could consent to
such conditions consistently with their dignity as a free person
not subject to the will of another.210
Finally, the freedom-based rationale for public goods also applies to the environment. A polluter affects the ability of the individuals in his vicinity to make use of their meansKtheir bodily
health and property. Trespass is unavailable if there is no tangible physical invasion.211 On the other hand, private nuisance,
deLined as the 9nontrespassory invasion oL another’s interest in
and non-navigable rivers, though they were in some respects separately dealt
with by the Praetor’s Edicts.8).
209. Kant argues that the moral obligation to enter into an original contract
implies that the State must provide 9the means of sustenance to those who are
unable to provide for even their most necessary natural needs.8 DR 6:326, at
468. Note that this and the surrounding passages are unusual and differ from
the general tenor of his legal theory, in that they seem to invoke welfare concerns. As such, it may be more aQQurate to desQribe this artiQle’s justification
of socioeconomic rights as a Kantian argument, based upon Kant’s contemporary interpreters. See generally RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13,
at ch. 9; Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of
Human Rights, 15 LEG. THEORY 301, 330N32 (2009); Ernest J. Weinrib, Poverty
and Property in Kant’s System of Rights, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 795, 810N21
(2002).
210. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 279N81.
211. Rechtshaffen and Antolini argue that 9[i]n the environmental context, a
key issue in a trespass action is whether an appropriate 9object8 has indeed
entered plaintiff’s property. Traditionally, the thing has to be 9tangible,8 that
is visibleKsuch as shrapnel from a bullet, a utility line, or an armKand it must
have caused 9direct8 interference. . . .8 While they note that some courts have
9loosened up on8 the directness requirement in the wake of scientific advances
regarding 9dust, vibration, and smoke,8 they also acknowledge that 9[m]any
courts have been unwilling to extend trespass in this direction because it would
produce 6too much liability.’8 (internal citations omitted). Clifford
Rechtschaffen & Denise E. Antolini, Common Law Remedies: A Refresher, in
CREATIVE COMMON LAW STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT 11, 14N
15 (Clifford Rechtschaffen & Denise E. Antolini eds., 2007).
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the private use and enJoy/ent oL land,8212 requires applicants to
prove non-negligible damage and trace its causation by the individual defendant polluter.213 This is all but impossible where
there are many different polluters contributing to environmental degradation, which takes place slowly over time.214 Thus, just
liHe the inhabitants oL ;ipstein’s roadless Qo//unity, viQti/s oL
pollution living under a system of pure private right are frustrated not just in the achievement of particular projects, but rendered systematically subject to the will of polluters. This calls
for a public and systematic solution in the form of environmental
regulation, which the state is obligated to provide.
The state’s obligation to provide publiQ goods endows it with
rights to do so and to compel subjects into doing what is necessary to maintain them. It may therefore impose taxes, expropriate land under eminent domain, and allow others to use or even
destroy others’ property in e/ergenQiesZ215 This is part of the offer that cannot be refused. You are unfreeKa prisoner in your
own homeKunless you agree to the scheme of public roads, so
force may be employed against you to secure your freedom.
Winally, QonduQt that interLeres with or Lrustrates the state’s
rights regarding the provision of public goods constitutes a
wrong not against the individual subjects harmed, but only
212. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821 D (1979).
213. See, e.g., Louisiana ex rel Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 903 (1986) (denying claims by plaintiffs,
whose fishing and shrimping activities were disrupted by an oil spill caused by
defendant).
214. See e.g., James R. Allum, “An Outcrop of Hell”: History, Environment,
and the Politics of the Trail Smelter Dispute, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 13, 19N20
(Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006) (describing the development of Canadian jurisprudence on environmental torts, whereby the onset of
the industrial revolution in the early twentieth century led to polluter’s liability being assessed against the productive value of the polluting activity, such
that courts 9demanded absolute proof of 9tangible economic injury8 before
granting compensation and only reluctantly imposed conditions on the future
operations of even the most egregious offenders.8).
215. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 253 (citing Taylor v.
Whitehead (1781) 99 Eng. Rep. 475, 477 (K.B.) (Eng.) (Lord Mansfield C.J.)
(holding that while the flooding of a private easement will not entitle the holder
to traverse on land to the side of it, 9[h]ighways are governed by a different
principle. They are for the public service, and if the usual tract is impassable,
it is for the general good that people should be entitled to pass in another
line.8).
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against the state, in public nuisance.216 Public nuisance is structurally distinct from the complaint of an individual subject in
private nuisance. Firstly, it is available only for interference
with a 9public right8Kthat is, 9an indivisible resourQe shared by
the public at large, like air, water, or public rights oL wayZ8217
Secondly, it cannot be explained as an aggregation of harms suffered by multiple private persons.218 To illustrate, imagine you
and your friends decide to play football in the middle of a highway, thereby Qausing a traLLiQ Ja/Z The 9viQti/s8 whom you hold
up in traffic may lose significant income as a result of being
made late for various appointments, but they nevertheless have
no cause of action against you.219 Your conduct harms them, but
does not wrong them. Instead, the only person who may complain of a wrong is the state, in public nuisance.220 As regards
this wrong, however, harm is irrelevant.221 You would be liable
216. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 261N62.
217. State v. Lead Industries Assn., 951 A.2d 428 (R.I. 2008) (holding paint
manufacturers not liable for harms caused by lead paint in private homes under private nuisance) (citations omitted).
218. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §821B, cmt. g (1979) (9Conduct does
not become a public nuisance merely because it interferes with the use and
enjoyment of land by a large number of persons.8); Thomas W. Merrill, Is Public Nuisance a Tort?, 4 J. TORT L. 1, 10 (2011).
219. Anglo-American common law is sometimes thought to allow private litigants to recover 9special injury8 under public nuisance. Iveson v. Moore (1699)
91 Eng. Rep. 486 (KB) (Eng.) (holding that deterioration of plaintiff’s coals
caused by defendant’s obstruction of highway is recoverable as special damage); Rose v. Miles (1815) 105 Eng. Rep. 773 (KB) (Eng.) (holding that plaintiff
barge owner is allowed to recover special damages from defendant, whose obstruction of canal required him to transport goods overland at great cost). Merrill argues that the special damage exception is the result of a misreading of a
sixteenth-century case, and that contemporary doctrine recognizes that the
private individual’s claim is a separate cause of action from the public nuisance. Merrill, supra note 218, at 13N15, citing an anonymous Year Book decision of 1535, reported at Y.B. Mich., 27 Henry 8, n. 27. See also RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS, Introduction to ch. 40, 217N18 (1939) (9An individual cannot
maintain an action for a public nuisance as such. . . . The private action for
personal injuries from a public nuisance, like the action for private nuisance,
is an action on the case, and it is often called an action for nuisance.8).
220. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 261N62. See also Merrill,
supra note 218, at 12N16 (arguing that public nuisance is enforced only by public actions).
221. See Merrill, supra note 218, at 17 (arguing that public nuisance 9does
not require proof of actual injury,8 meaning harm, nor does it 9typically require
that the defendant be shown to have engaged in particular acts giving rise to
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in public nuisance even if, miraculously, no traffic was disrupted
at all.222
Thus stated, ;ipstein’s theory oL publiQ goods bears an obvious
resemblance to the public trust doctrine in U.S. environmental
law. In the celebrated article in which that doctrine was first
expounded, Joseph Sax observed that of the three strands of
preQedent that he drew Lro/, the one 9with the greatest historiQal support8 was one whiQh held 9that Qertain interests are so
intrinsically important to every citizen that their free availability tends to mark the society as one of citizens rather than of
serLsZ8223 ;ipstein’s aQQount diLLers, however, in that it does not
suggest or require any notion of property rights.224 It thus avoids
a number of difficulties identified by Sax regarding the idea of
common property ownership by citizens.225 For instance, governments are constitutionally obligated to compensate owners for
takings of property. If, however, the owners are the people, then
governments, as representatives of the people, may presumably
just pay themselves.226 Beneficial ownership also suggests that,
contrary to law and policy, the designation of things as trust
property is irrevocable.227 In the end, Sax concedes that the funda/ental QonQern is not about the state’s rights and obligations

the condition or that the defendant did so in breach of some duty or standard
of care.8).
222. Id. at 10 (9The blockage is therefore an injury common to the general
public. It does not matter whether the road or the waterway is actually used
by everyone or indeed by anyone at all.8).
223. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 484 (1970). See also Joseph
L. Sax, Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 189 (1980) (observing that French customary laws preserving forests, meadows and pastures as common property preserved a measure of economic independence of the peasantry from their feudal lords, which
was gradually lost by the enclosure of the commons).
224. See, e.g., City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 449 (1927) (9The equitable title to those submerged lands vests in the public at large, while the
legal title vests in the state, restricted only by the trust, and the trust, being
both active and administrative, requires the law-making body to act in all cases
where action is necessary, not only to preserve the trust, but to promote it.8).
225. Id. at 484 (remarking upon the 9rather dubious notion that the general
public should be viewed as a property holder.8).
226. Sax, supra note 223, at 479N80.
227. Id. at 482 (9However strongly one might feel about the present imbalance in resource allocation, it hardly seems sensible to ask for a freezing of any
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relating to property but about its status as an authority: the
state /ay not 9divest itselL oL authority to govern the whole of
an area in which it has responsibility to exercise its police power
Z Z Z in eLLeQt, to abdiQate legislative authority over navigationZ8228
These problems of property do not arise in legal systems based
upon the Roman law. For instance, in the South African case of
Mostert Snr v. S, the defendant farmers had, among other
things, been convicted of theft for illegally abstracting water
from the Lomati river.229 On appeal, the South African Supreme
Court of Appeal reasoned that:
Roman law recognised certain things as being res extra patrimonium which were incapable of being owned, including those
things classified as res communes being 9things oL Qo//on en[
joyment, available to all living persons by virtue of their existenQeZ8 Public water, running in a river or a stream, was recognised as being res communes and therefore incapable of being
owned. . . . As water in a public stream was therefore incapable
of being owned, it was also incapable of being stolen. . . .230

The deLendants’ QonviQtion Lor theLt was aQQordingly reversed,
leaving them liable solely for other offenses.231 This result,
though curious, is correct. As the Scottish judge Lord Kames
once held, if rivers and other public goods were property, the
state could potentially alienate them to one person, thus 9put[
ting it in the power of one man to lay waste a whole QountryZ8232

future specific configuration of policy judgments, for that result would seriously hamper the government’s ability to cope with the problems caused by
changes in the needs and desires of the citizenry.8).
228. Id. at 489, citing Illinois Central Railroad v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
229. Mostert Snr. and another v. S (2010) 2 All SA 482 (Supreme Court of
Appeal) (S. Afr.).
230. Id. ¶¶ 22N23.
231. Id. ¶ 36.
232. Magistrates of Linlithgow v. Elphinstone, (1768) 3 Kames’s Decisions
331, 332 (S.C.) (Scot.). See also H. Jones & Co. Pty. Ltd. v. Kingborough Corporation (1950) 82 C.L.R. 282, ¶ 18 (Aus.) (9A right to use the water of a stream
(and all the water thereof if that can lawfully be done) is illusory if the flow of
the stream can be diminished at will by another person. A positive right in a
landowner to the use of the water of a stream prima facie invites a right to
present such interference with the stream as would prevent him from using
the water.8).
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C. Limitations upon the Right to Provide Public Goods
"eQause the state’s right to provide publiQ goods derives Lro/
its fiduciary obligations toward its subjects, any measures it may
take are open to two types of legal challenge: lack of public purpose and lack of necessity. The first limitation arises from the
nature of the state as a public person. The state is a separate
person from its subjects constituted for the single purpose of ensuring their e*ual Lreedo/, whiQh it does by eapressing the 9gen[
eral will8 oL the peopleZ233 !ontrary to "envenisti’s Lirst nor/a[
tive ground, the purpose of the state is not to serve as a forum
Lor the Qelebration oL its subJeQts’ Qo//on sy/pathies, whiQh are
necessarily private affairs.234 The performance of religious rituals and compliance with sumptuary laws may be generally desired but difficult to achieve in the absence of official compulsion.235 Such compulsion, however, would be incompatible with
the rightful condition.236
This Qan be illustrated again by fworHin’s /etaphor oL an or[
chestra. To wit, an orchestra consists of individual musicians
who possess private habits, desires, and aspirations that may be
vastly different from each another. The orchestra itself, however, can only have one purposeKmaking music. As Dworkin explains, the orQhestra’s /e/bers 9do not suppose that the orQhes[
tra also has a sex life, in some way composed of the sexual activities of its members, or that it has headaches, or high blood pressure, or responsibilities of friendship, or crises over whether it
should care less about music and take up photography insteadZ8237 Similarly, as a public person, the state can only have
a public purposeKthe provision of equal freedom for its subjects.238 It therefore cannot establish an official religion, even one
233. See DR 6:326, at 468 (9The general will of the people has united itself
into a society which is to maintain itself perpetually; and for this end it has
submitted itself to the internal authority of the state in order to maintain those
members of the society who are unable to maintain themselves.8).
234. DR 6:327, at 469 (arguing that the state must keep a close guard on
religious institutions, lest they come into 9very unequal conflict with the civil
power.8).
235. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 259N60.
236. DR 6:327, at 469 (arguing that for a sovereign to establish a religion
would be 9beneath its dignity,8 for thereby 9the monarch makes himself a
priest. . . .8).
237. See DWORKIN, supra note 173, at 227.
238. DR 6:318, at 461 (arguing that 9the well-being of a state must not be
understood as the welfare of its citizens and their happiness; for happiness can
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practiced by every one of its subjects. Any such law would maniLest not the people’s general will, but their 9parallel8 willsZ239
This is not simply because of concern for minorities not sharing
the /aJority’s sy/pathies but beQause the state would beQo/e
just another private person if it was to promote and advance the
private purposes of its individual constituents, and therefore unable to wield political authority rightfully.240 The second limitation Lollows Lro/ the LirstZ !oerQion is JustiLied only 9as a hindering of a hindrance to freedomZ8241 As such, the state cannot invade or exact any more than is necessary for the provision of
equal freedom. Anything in excess can only be for a private purpose.242
IV. INTERNATIONAL LAW: PROPERTY AND BODY
PubliQ goods beQo/e 9global8 when they Qannot be provided by
one state acting alone. Perhaps the only passable roads or navigable waterways run through the territory of another country,
or the polluters are ensconced on a distant continent. This does
not and cannot mean that the members of a political community
are to be denied the freedom that is their innate right. Elucidating this, however, requires a theory of the legal relations between one state and another. The starting point is that as persons, the dignity of states also lies in freedom from the arbitrary
choice of others.243 Like natural persons, their freedom is unre-

perhaps come to them more easily and as they would like it to in a state of
nature (as Rousseau asserts) or even under a despotic government. By the wellbeing of a state is understood . . . that condition in which its constitution conforms most fully to principles of right. . . .8).
239. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 132.
240. See DWORKIN, supra note 173, at 223 (criticizing a strand of communitarian thinking for 9suppos[ing] that a communal life is the life of an outsize
person, that it has the same shape, encounters the same moral and ethical
watersheds and dilemmas, and is subject to the same standards of success and
failure as the several lives of the citizens who make it up.8).
241. DR 6:231, at 388.
242. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 254.
243. See Ruiz Fabri, supra note 190, at 34 (arguing that sovereignty 9is the
legal translation of the political notion of independence . . . and should not be
understood as a power, but as a freedom: the freedom of the state to exercise
as it sees fit the powers at its disposal.8); Martti Koskenniemi, What Use for
Sovereignty Today?, 1 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 61, 70 (2011) (arguing that 9[s]overeignty articulates the hope of experiencing the thrill of having one’s life in one’s
own hands.8).
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alizable in an international state of nature, but requires a rightful condition to be set up.244 "envenisti’s Lourth nor/ative
ground is correct. Subjection to international law is not just compatible with sovereignty, but necessary for it.
The international state of nature, however, differs from the domestic, in that there is only one defect, not three.245 The defect
common to both conditions is the indeterminacy of rights. For
the same reasons that apply to natural persons, states can never
settle their disputes through war.246 Because Grotius, Pufendorf,
and Vattel contend otherwise and argue that states are entitled
to make war if they think they have a just claim or that war is a
suitable procedure for settling legal disputes, they therefore
serve to encourage endless war, which is why Kant excoriates
the/ as 9sorry Qo/Lorters8 in the Perpetual Peace.247 Instead,
only under the international rightLul Qondition 9Qan the idea oL a
publiQ ;ight oL Rations be reali`ed,8 beQause states /ay deQide
9their disputes in a Qivil way, as iL by lawsuit, rather than in a
barbaric way (the way of savages), namely by warZ8248
An executive is unnecessary at the international level because,
unlike private persons, republican democracies are supposed to
be fully rational. Private persons must surrender the enforcement of their rights to an executive because they are a seething
mess of mutually incompatible passions. Rightfully constituted
states need not because they have only one purpose: the provision of a rightful condition for their subjects. Peace will be guaranteed among rightfully constituted states so long as the persons
deciding whether or not to go to war are the publicKthe people
who will carry out the actual fighting and the repayment of war
debtsKrather than unaccountable monarchs or military-industrial lobbies.249 Rightfully constituted states will also remain at
peace with nonrightfully constituted states for as long as possible under a precarious modus vivendi. Where this is not possible,

244. DR 6:344, at 482.
245. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 227N28.
246. DR 6:354, at 491 (concluding that 9morally practical reason pronounces
in us its irresistible veto: there is to be no war, neither war between you and
me in the state of nature nor war between us as states . . . for war is not the
way in which everyone should seek his rights.8).
247. PP 8:355, at 326.
248. DR 6:351, at 488.
249. PP 8:350-51, at 324.
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rightLully Qonstituted states, aQting in QonQert under a 9QonLed[
eration of peaQe,8 Qan and will be Just as warliHe as nonrightLully
constituted states are with respect to one another.250
Once again, however, legislatures are our main concern, but
this time the question is why the international rightful condition
lacks one. In Part II, we saw that the domestic rightful condition
requires a legislature to make property ownership possible.
There is no legislature at the international level because rightfully constituted states do not own property. Contrary to Benvenisti’s third nor/ative intuition, sovereigns are not proprietors oL portions oL the earth’s surLaQeZ Un LaQt, they are not pro[
prietors of anything at all.
Recall that property rights are acquired rights to external objects of choice; that is, things that could have been another’s iL
events had panned out differently. If you and your friend were
to exchange belongings, your lifestyles would be transformed,
perhaps immeasurably, but the two of you could still carry on
with the identities you ordinarily present to the world. Not quite
so if you exchanged bodies. Similarly, Ruritania and Cagliostro
would not simply be changed if they exchanged their lands, natural endowments, and people. They would simply cease to exist
as ;uritania or !agliostroZ #QQordingly, a state 9is always necessarily in possession of its territory, just as a person is always
in possession oL his or her own bodyZ8251 The state does not own
its territory, government, and natural resourcesKit is the territory, government, and natural resources.
While Kant does not say this in so many words, there are several passages which lead to this conclusion. For instance, while
Sant does say that title to the state’s land is held by the head oL
state aQting as the 9supre/e proprietor,8252 he describes that role
as consisting solely in organi`ing the 9division8 oL the land, ra[
ther than as an 9aggregation8 oL private ownership Qlai/s
250. See also JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES: WITH, THE IDEA OF PUBLIC
REASON REVISITED 44N45 (§5) (1999); Michael W. Doyle, Kant, Liberal Legacies,
and Foreign Affairs, 12 PHIL. & PUB. AFFS. 205 (1983) (offering an empirical
demonstration of the 9democratic peace theory8^Z In the Doctrine of Right, Kant
ceases to believe in the possibility, much less 9guarantee,8 of eternal peace.
Instead, he argues that human beings and states nevertheless have the duty
to continually 9approximate8 toward it, even if it is all ultimately futile. DR
6:350, at 487.
251. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 228.
252. DR 6:323, at 466.
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therein.253 Moreover, 9dacll land belongs only to the people _and
the people taHen distributively, not QolleQtivelyZ Z Z Z^Z8254 The difference between property and sovereignty is also apparent from
Sant’s disQussion oL the right oL e/igrationZ # subJeQt has the
right to emigrate because the state cannot hold him back as if he
were the state’s propertyZ255 He can, however, only take his movable belongings, which includes the liquid proceeds of the sale of
his land.256 Only the property is transmissible, not the sovereignty. With respect to the subject, a particular clod of earth is
property. With respect to the state, however, it is body.
Certainly, an objection may be made that a cursory glance at
history would show that there is probably no inhabited spot on
earth over which sovereignty has not changed hands on multiple
occasions, such as might suggest that territory is transmissible
in the manner of property. In response, Kant would say that this
is precisely what makes it so wrongful:
Everyone knows into what danger the presumption that acquisition can take place in this way has brought Europe, the only
part of the world in which it is known . . . that states can marry
each other, partly as a new industry for making oneself predo/inant by La/ily allianQes even without eapending one’s
LorQes, and partly as a way oL eatending one’s possession oL
land.257

If territories and the resources and populations located there
are treated like baubles to be bought and sold or won and lost,
this increases the likelihood of disputes, and therefore wars.258
For precisely this reason, the Second Preliminary Article to the
Perpetual Peace speQiLies that 9dnco independently eaisting state

253. DR 6:323-24, at 466.
254. DR 6:324, at 466.
255. DR 6:338, at 515.
256. Id.
257. PP 8:344, at 318.
258. PP 8:350, at 324 (arguing that if the 9head of state is not a member of
the state but its proprietor,8 there will be nothing to stop him from 9decid[ing]
upon a war, as upon a kind of pleasure partyZ Z Z Z8^ See also Arthur Ripstein,
Just War, Regular War, and Perpetual Peace, 107 KANT-STUDIEN 179, 188
(2016) (9The idea of selling, exchanging, bequeathing or donating a state follows from the proprietary model of the state. It is no surprise that Kant also
identifies this as a source of war. . . . If states are essentially private and subject
to the claims of private right, disputes about them will multiply, and war becomes a means of acquisition.8).
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(whether small or large) shall be acquired by another state
through inheritanQe, eaQhange, purQhase, or donationZ8259
The argument goes further: it claims not just that land, resources, and people are not property, but also that the sovereign
cannot have property at all. Full-blooded property ownership in
a thing is a truly despotic right to dispose of it as you please.260
This is so clearly incompatible with any kind of public role that
Sant QonQludes that the sovereign 9Qannot have any land at all
as his private property (for otherwise he would make himself a
private person).8261 The possessory rights of sovereigns are not
the same as that which private persons have over their property.262 They are instead akin to the rights private persons have
over their bodies, or the administrative powers fiduciaries possess over their beneficiaries.263 Whereas private persons may

259. PP 8:344, at 318.
260. See HARRIS, supra note 141, at 31 (observing that 9[o]wnership interests,
at any point on the spectrum, entail both open-endedness and permitted selfseeking . . . within the terms of the relevant property institution, [the owner]
may defend any use or exercise of power by pointing out that, as owner, he was
at liberty to suit himself.8).
261. DR 6:323-24, at 466.
262. Ripstein, Property and Sovereignty, supra note 158, at 12 (9Ordinarily,
an official is charged with advancing or protecting the purposes of the institution in which that office is found. By contrast, an owner typically has untrammelled discretion with respect to the purposes for which the property will be
used. 6Do whatever you want’ is not a mandate.8); HARRIS, supra note 141, at
105 (arguing that 9the privileged domain [regarding dealings with state funds
or chattels] afforded to officials falls nowhere along the ownership spectrum
since it lacks the crucial feature of legitimate, self-seeking exploitation. . . .8^Z
While Harris claims that states only have quasi-ownership rights in the domestic sphere, he notes in passing that 9within the arena of public international law, self-seeking exploitation is allowed,8 and 9trespassory rules [of international law] protect 6State territory’ and 6State territorial sea’, concepts
which, in this respect, are frankly modelled on private property ownership interests. . . .8 Id. These conclusory statements assume without question the conventional idea of sovereigns as domestically public but internationally private
actors, which Benvenisti and this article both reject. The state is public, inside
and out. See Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 306.
263. See Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 158N59 (1886) (internal
citations omitted):
The United States do not and cannot hold property as a monarch may, for private or personal purposes. All the property
and revenues of the United States must be held and applied,
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have full-blooded ownership, but only over particular things, the
sovereign only has administrative rights, but over everything.264
A. The Body of the State: Territory, Natural Resources, and
People
The argument that sovereigns cannot have property rights at
all does not mean that states may not award themselves property rights in lands or chattels under either their own law, or
under the law of another state. Such rights must be respected,
but not as rights of sovereigns, only as rights of private persons.265 Rather, the argument is that sovereigns cannot have
property titles created under, or recognized by international law.
A full treatment of how this theoretical claim translates into international law will have to await another occasion.266 Instead,
as all taxes, duties, imposts and excises must be laid and collected, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence
and general welfare of the United States.
264. This principle is expressed in Latin as omnia rex imperio possidet, singuli dominio, which translates as 9For the king has authority over everything,
but individuals have ownership.8 LUCIUS ANNAEUS SENECA, ON BENEFITS 170
(Book 7, §4.2) (Miriam Griffin & Brad Inwood trans., 2011).
265. See, e.g., XIAODONG YANG, STATE IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 343
(2012) (finding that 9[g]enerally speaking, the property of a foreign State enjoys immunity from attachment, arrest and execution when it is used for sovereign or public purposes, but not when it is used for commercial purposes.8).
See id. at 369N73 for relevant international case law.
266. See the recent litigation between Australia and Timor-Leste before the
International Court of Justice, arising from Australia’s seizure of certain 9documents, data, and other property8 from Timor-Leste’s legal advisers in Australia. Application Instituting Proceedings, Timor-Leste v. Austl., ¶ 2 (Dec. 17,
2013), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/156/17962.pdf. The litigation was eventually settled out of court. During oral arguments, Timor-Leste
claimed that this was in violation of its 9property rights [which were] entitled
to full respect on the international plane in whatever State they may be located
. . . no matter what special provisions may be asserted by Australian law
against them.8 Timor-Leste v. Austl., Verbatim Record, 27N28 (Jan. 20, 2014,
10:00 AM), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/156/17920.pdf. Australia conceded that it had taken the documents but countered that such a
claim of 9an absolute, unqualified right of property at international law,8 allowing each state 9an absolute right of property in all documents produced by
it or its agents in the territory of another State . . . inviolable and immune from
any judicial or executive action in that other State,8 was tantamount to 9a new
form of extraterritoriality8 and 9a quantum leap in the expansion of public international law.8 Id. at 11N12. Australia further argued that the Timorese argument would 9allow a State adventitiously to expand its sovereignty into the
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this section will argue only that sovereigns cannot be seen as
property owners over seQtions oL the earth’s surLaQeZ
As with most things in the contemporary study of international law, the first word on this subject belongs to Lauterpacht,
who was instru/ental in burying the 9territory-as-body8 view
advoQated in this artiQle, whiQh he Qalls the 9obJeQt8 theoryZ267 As
a result of his contributions, contemporary textbooks almost uniformly profess that the international law of territory was developed from analogy to the Roman law of immovable property.268
Lauterpacht acknowledges two attractive features of the territory-as-body conception. First, it avoids the problem of the patrimonial state, whose sovereign could buy, sell, devise, or even
give away whole provinces and the people living on them.269 Second, Lauterpacht acknowledges that territory and state appear
to be an 9inseparable unity,8 liHe person and body,270 and even

territory of other States.8 Id. at 12. Tzeng observes that, 9[a]s absurd as it may
sound, Australia is correct.8 Peter Tzeng, Comment: The State’s Right to Property Under International Law, 125 YALE L.J. 1805N1819, 1805 (2016). See also
JOHN G. SPRANKLING, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PROPERTY (2014). Sprankling’s monograph appears to be the only book-length study on the subject of
property in international law, but consists entirely of the international law
pertaining to or regulating the property rights of private persons, rather than
States. Tzeng, supra, at 1806, n. 8. Moreover, Spranking observes that property 9was historically viewed as a domestic concern8 and that the 9conventional
wisdom is that international property law does not exist as a category.8
SPRANKLING, supra, at 349.
267. Hersch Lauterpacht, Property Relations Between States. State Territory,
in INTERNATIONAL LAW: VOLUME 1, THE GENERAL WORKS: BEING THE COLLECTED
PAPERS OF HERSCH LAUTERPACHT 367, 367 (Eli Lauterpacht ed., 1970).
268. See, e.g., ROBERT Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (1963) (explaining that 9the so-called modes of acquisition of territorial sovereignty . . . are, as we shall see, obviously derived by
analogy from the Roman Law rules governing the acquisition of land in private
ownership.8); JAMES L. BRIERLY & ANDREW CLAPHAM, BRIERLY’S LAW OF
NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 168N69 (7th ed. 2012) (9Territorial sovereignty
bears an obvious resemblance to ownership in private law. . . . As a result of
this resemblance, early international law borrowed the Roman rules for the
acquisition of property, and adapted them to the acquisition of territory, and
these rules are still used as the foundation of the law on the subject.8);
MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 353N54 (2014).
269. Lauterpacht, supra note 267, at 367.
270. Id. at 367N68.
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explicitly recommends the dominus membrorum rule as preferable to body-extension theories of property.271
Nevertheless, Lauterpacht dismisses these problems by resorting to the faulty device of the state as an aggregation of individuals, arguing that:
If we think of the State not in terms of an absolute and mystical
entity but as the totality of the individuals organised as a
State, then there is nothing artificial in regarding the State as
the owner of territory. The individuals, in their collective capacity as a State, own the territory of the State. The State owns
its territory.272

The bulH oL LauterpaQht’s argu/ent against the obJeQt theory
of territory is that it was at total variance with then prevalent
state practice. Exchange and sale was recognized as a perfectly
legal means of territorial acquisition between states, such a
transaction having taken place as recently as 1917, when the
United States bought the Danish West Indies for $25 million
USD.273 Other then customary practices included condominia,
leases and grants in perpetuity, international mandates, and the
acquisition of territory by prescription.274 Regarding the final
category of acquisition of territory by prescription, the leading
authority was Island of Palmas, in which the arbitrator Max Huber explicitly likened territory to private property in land.275
The first three examples are precisely the sort of practices that
would be abolished under an international order that deemed
some connection with democracy, human rights, and law to be
necessary. Leased territories, such as Guantanamo Bay and Diego Garcia, are bywords for lawlessness and rampant human
rights violations, while the British-French condominium over
the Rew Hebrides Lelt /ore liHe 9pande/oniu/8 to the loQal in[
habitants.276 Moreover, unlike the purely mercenary terms in
271. Id. at 368.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 367N68.
274. Id. at 370N80.
275. Island of Palmas, 2 R.I.A.A. at 839 (holding that international law had
to recognize acquisitive prescription of territory out of necessity, given that
even municipal law felt unable to do so without adverse possession of land,
despite possessing a 9complete judicial system8 enabling it to 9recognize abstract rights of property as existing apart from any material display of themZ8).
276. MICHELLE BENNETT & JOCELYN HAREWOOD, LONELY PLANET: VANUATU 14
(2003). See also CAROL ROSENBERG, GUANTÁNAMO BAY: THE PENTAGON’S
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which Lauterpacht describes the sale of colonies, independent
states treat the transfer of territory as a matter of utmost legal
and political sensitivity. Consider the widespread public anger
against the perceived 9sale8 oL Qertain ;ed :ea islands Lro/
Egypt to Saudi Arabia,277 or the scuppering on constitutional
grounds of a Norwegian popular initiative to gift the peak of
Mount Halti to Finland as a 100th birthday present.278
LauterpaQht’s Linal eaa/ple, the aQ*uisition of territory by
prescription, has undergone a sea change since Island of Palmas. The current leading case of Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso
v. Mali) emphatically rejects prescription by effectivités (effective
administration) by one state of the territory of another, and instead requires the positive acquiescence of the latter.279 While
inaction might controversially constitute affirmative evidence of
acquiescence or recognition, the rule is definitively no longer one
of unilateral prescription.280 This departure from the principles
ALCATRAZ OF THE CARIBBEAN (2016); DAVID VINE, ISLAND OF SHAME: THE SECRET
HISTORY OF THE U.S. MILITARY BASE ON DIEGO GARCIA chs. 8 & 9 (2011); Laura
Jeffrey & David Vine, Sorry, Sadness, and Impoverishment: The Lives of Chagossians in Mauritius, in EVICTION FROM THE CHAGOS ISLANDS: DISPLACEMENT
AND STRUGGLE FOR IDENTITY AGAINST TWO WORLD POWERS 83, 83 (Sandra Evers
& Marry Kooy eds., 2011) (relating how a displaced Chagos Islander characterizes the 9deal8 by which Mauritius agreed to the hiving off of the Chagos
Islands in exchange for independence as one where 9Mauritius got independence because it sold my mother’s land.8).
277. Ruth Michaelson, Egyptian Court Quashes Deal to Transfer Red Sea Islands to Saudi Arabia, GUARDIAN, June 21, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/egyptian-court-quashes-transfer-red-sea-islandssaudi-arabia.
278. Agence France-Presse, Halti Plan Halted: Norway Will Not Gift Mountain Top to Neighbour Finland, GUARDIAN, Oct. 15, 2016,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/15/halti-plan-halted-norwaywill-not-gift-mountain-top-to-neighbour-finland.
279. See Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, ¶ 63 (Dec. 22)
(holding that 9[w]here the territory which is the subject of the dispute is effectively administered by a State other than the one possessing the legal title,
preference should be given to the holder of the title.8). See Roger O’Keefe, Legal
Title versus Effectivités: Prescription and the Promise and Problems of Private
Law Analogies, 13 INT’L COMM’TY L. REV. 147, 176N77 (2011).
280. Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and
South Ledge (Malay. v. Sing.) 2008 I.C.J. 12, ¶ 121 (May 23) (observing that
9silence may also speak, but only if the conduct of the other State calls for a
response.8). See id. at Diss. Op. Simma & Abraham, JJ., ¶ 11 (criticizing the
majority’s finding of affirmative consent in silence as a smuggling in acquisitive prescription); see id. ¶ 13 (emphasizing that 9when there is an original
sovereign, no exercise of State authority, however continuous and effective, can
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of private property has been invoked to question the entire enterprise of private law analogies in explicating international
law.281 There is, however, another possibility: that the correct
analogy is not to property but to personality. Territory, like body,
is in principle inalienable. The new requirement of positive acquiescence reflects that where transfers of territory are concernedKand by implication the inhabitants and natural resources contained thereinKinternational law places burdens not
against acquisition, but against alienation. It cannot be done except under a strict legal regime guaranteeing genuine free
choice.282 LauterpaQht’s application of principles taken from colonial and imperial practice to independent states is in fact an
instanQe oL LoQHe’s speQtaQular non sequitur. From the fact that
a state is independent if no other colonial or imperial power owns
its territory, it simply does not follow that it owns the territory.
In fact, nobody owns the territory, not even the independent
state.
As the state’s body, the territorial bounds, natural resourQes,
and population are indeed arbitrary, but they are arbitrary in
the manner of bodily endowments rather than property holdings. This means that they cannot be altered for reasons of distributive equity. The ICJ has twice rejected sufficiency-based arguments for established borders to be altered. In Land, Island
and Maritime Frontier Dispute, the ICJ held that 9argu/ents oL
a hu/an nature,8 suQh as El :alvador’s high population density
and Honduras’ abundanQe oL natural resourQes, Qould not JustiLy
any deviation from the doctrine of uti possidetis.283 In Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libya), the ICJ rejected a similar Lockean
result in a transfer of sovereignty if it is not possible to establish that, in one
way or another, the original sovereign has consented to the cession of the territory concerned or acquiesced in its transfer to the State having de facto exercised its authority.8).
281. O’Keefe, supra note 279, at 187N88.
282. See Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Sal. v. Hond.; Nicar.
intervening), 1992 I.C.J. 351, ¶ 67 (Sept. 11) (9If the uti possidetis juris position
can be qualified by adjudication and by treaty, the question then arises
whether it can be qualified in other ways, for example, by acquiescence or
recognition. There seems to be no reason in principle why these factors should
not operate, where there is sufficient evidence to show that the parties have in
effect clearly accepted a variation. . . .8).
283. Id. ¶¶ 40, 57N58. See also Michal Saliternik, Expanding the Boundaries
of Boundary Dispute Settlement: International Law and Critical Geography at
the Crossroads, 50 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L. L. 113, 123N26 (2017) (arguing that
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proviso-style argument by Tunisia against resource-rich Libya
on the grounds that natural resourQes are 9variables whiQh un[
predictable national fortune or calamity . . . might at any time
cause to tilt the scale one way or the other. A country might be
poor today and become rich tomorrow as a result of an event such
as the disQovery oL a valuable eQono/iQ resourQeZ8284 Treating
state territory as contingent upon the Lockean proviso would
render the state’s very existence subject to the choices of other
personsKfrom individual market participants to other states
with Qlai/s oL needZ # state’s territory, and Qonse*uently the
lives and loyalties of the human beings inhabiting it, cannot be
rendered so precarious. Moreover, as the ICJ observed in Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), existing borders must be respected no matter how poorly they were drawn by former coloni`ers, 9to prevent the independenQe and stability oL new :tates
[from] being endangered by fratricidal struggles provoked by the
challenging oL LrontiersZ Z Z Z8285 If territories are treated as transmissible property, disputes about these transactions will multiply, and therefore also wars.
B. International Wrongs: Iniuria and Restitution
If the state has no property rights, but only personality rights,
wrongs against it necessarily constitute injury rather than damage. This principle animates the classic Chorzów Factory decision, where the Permanent Court of International Justice held
that:
The rules of law governing the reparation are the rules of international law in force between the two States concerned, and
not the law governing relations between the State which has
committed a wrongful act and the individual who has suffered
damage. Rights or interests of an individual the violation of
which rights causes damage are always in a different plane to
rights belonging to a State, which rights may also be infringed
by the same act. The damage suffered by an individual is never
therefore identical in kind with that which will be suffered by
a State. . . .286
the determining factor in boundary disputes is the historical borders, and
where these are unclear, effective control of territory).
284. Continental Shelf (Tunis. v. Libya), 1982 I.C.J. 473, ¶ 107 (Feb. 24).
285. Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J., ¶ 20, (Dec. 22).
286. Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits) (Germ. v. Pol.), 1928
P.C.I.J. 4, 28 (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13).
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Wrongs against the state and against subjects differ not in degree but in kind. Whereas private persons suffer damage as a
result of wrongful deprivations of property, their national state
is dealt injury by the mistreatment of its subjects. The latter
Qause oL aQtion is the state’s own, and not derivative of the wrong
against its mistreated nationals.287 It has full discretion to decide whether or not to bring suit on behalf of its national, to compromise or settle without consulting with the national, or, if it
obtains reparations, decline to hand anything over to the national.288 These commonplaces of international legal doctrine
make sense only if the wrong that is being righted is not damage
suffered by the national, but the injury to the state.289
As injury, /aterial da/age is irrelevant: 9there is no general
requirement . . . that a State should have suffered material harm
or damage before it can seek reparation Lor a breaQhZ8290 As for
re/edies, the 9essential prinQiple Qontained in the aQtual notion
287. Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Gr. Brit.), 1924 P.C.I.J.
(ser. A) No. 2, 12 (Aug. 30) (holding that 9[b]y taking up the case of one of its
subjects . . . a State is in reality asserting its own rightsKits right to ensure,
in the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.8).
288. See Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Co. Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), 1970
I.C.J. 3, 45 (Feb. 5) (9Since the claim of the State is not identical with that of
the individual or corporate person whose cause is espoused, the State enjoys
complete freedom of action.8). See also ZACHARY DOUGLAS, THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF INVESTMENT CLAIMS 17N18 (§34) (2009); EDWIN M. BORCHARD, THE
DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD 366 (§144) (1916).
289. These basic principles have not been changed by recent efforts to center
the law of diplomatic protection around the interests of individual persons, see
e.g., International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection
with Commentaries, UN Doc.A/61/10 (2006). Although Article 1 of the Draft
Articles provides that 9diplomatic protection consists of the invocation by a
State . . . of the responsibility of another State for an injury caused by an internationally wrongful act of that State to a natural or legal person,8 Article 19
nevertheless only deems it a 9recommended practice8 for a State to consider
the views and wishes of the injured national to transfer the obtained compensation to her, subject to reasonable reduction.
290. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in
Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-Third
Session, UN GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 43, UN Doc. A/56/10 (2001),
Article 31, cmt. 7, at 226 [hereinafter Articles on State Responsibility]. See also
Rainbow Warrior (New Zealand/France), 20 R.I.A.A. 217, ¶109 (1990) (recording the parties’ agreement that material damage is not a precondition for liability for international wrongs, but that 9injury8 may lie in 9legal8 or 9moral8
damage). This article has already criticized the concept of moral damage as
incoherent at note 94.
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of an illegal act . . . is that reparation must, as far as possible,
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish
the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that
aQt had not been Qo//ittedZ8291 For this reason, the authoritative Articles on State Responsibility provide that, 9beQause resti[
tution most closely conforms to the general principle that the responsible State is bound to wipe out the legal and material consequences of its wrongful act by re-establishing the situation
that would exist if the act had not been committed, it comes first
a/ong the Lor/s oL reparationZ8292
The purely secondary nature of material damage is demonstrated by the drafting history of the commentary to the Articles
on State Responsibility. In 2000, the Drafting Committee of the
International Law Commission (ILC) proposed a definition of
9inJury8 as Qonsisting 9oL any da/age, whether /aterial or
moral, arising in consequence of the internationally wrongful act
oL a :tateZ8293 James Crawford rightly criticizes this definition
by drawing attention to the difference between harms and
wrongs in terms similar to the discussion in Part I of this article,294 and noting that the final version of the commentary now
reads that 9dicnJury includes drather than 9Qonsists8 oLc any da/[
ageZ Z Z Z8295 In sum, wrongs pertaining to the territory and natural endowments of a stateKin fact all international wrongsK
have the nature of injuries rather than damage. As such, proof
of harm is irrelevant and the remedy is restitution. With this,
all the necessary machinery has been wheeled onto the stage,
and we are finally ready to address the problem of public goods
that cannot be provided by one state alone.

291. Chorzów Factory, 1928 P.C.I.J. at 47.
292. See Articles on State Responsibility, Article 35, cmt. 3, at 238. See also
JAMES CRAWFORD, STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE GENERAL PART 509N10 (2013)
(observing that the International Law Commission (ILC) retained the traditional principle that international wrongs sound primarily in restitution, despite considerable debate during the second reading of the Articles on State
Responsibility).
293. [2000] 2(2) Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2000/Add.1
(Part 2)/Rev.1, at 68.
294. See CRAWFORD, supra note 292, at 485.
295. Articles on State Responsibility, Art. 31(2) (emphasis added).
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V. GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS
The question posed earlier was whether states are prohibited
from regulating unilaterally to provide their subjects with public
goods, but must hope for the cooperation of other states to address the threat to its and its subJeQts’ Lreedo/Z The answer is
no. Requiring the state to pursue its purpose solely through multilateral channels would place it at the mercy of all other persons, state and nonstate, in the carrying out of its single purpose,
thus violating its dignity as a person. Like domestic public goods,
global public goods are either necessary for a sovereign to ensure
its subJeQts’ freedom, or to preserve its ability to do so. While
most of the global public goods mentioned in the introduction fall
under the second category, their rationale may be explicated by
considering those falling under the first.
A. The Theoretical Argument
Just as persons have rights to visit others in their community,
they also have 9Qos/opolitan8 rights to visit distant individuals
on the other side of the globe.296 Again, this is not justified by
reference to material advantages such as the benefits of trade.
In fact, Kant was more than just a little dubious of such claims.
In a blistering passage in the Perpetual Peace, Kant notices that
European trading companies were somehow always teetering on
the brinH oL insolvenQy, despite praQtiQing the 9Qruelest and /ost
QalQulated slavery8 in the :ugar UslandsZ297 Instead, he speculates that their actual function was to train sailors for wars back
ho/e in Europe on behalL oL prinQes who 9/aHe /uQh ado oL
their piety Z Z Z while they drinH wrongLulness liHe waterZ Z Z Z8298
Sant’s JustiLiQation oL Qos/opolitan right is again entirely formal. A person cannot be thwarted from attempting interaction
with distant others at the whim of another without good reason,
and the only reasons that are good are those that are non-dominating of her.299 Visiting with hostile purposes is incompatible
with the equal freedom of the hosts and may be prohibited by
296. DR 6:352, at 489.
297. PP 8:359, at 330.
298. Id.
299. PP 8:357-58, at 328N29 (explaining that 9[H]ospitality (hospitableness)
means the right of a foreigner not to be treated with hostility because he has
arrived on the land of another. The other can turn him away, if this can be
done without destroying him, but as long as he behaves peaceably where he is,
he cannot be treated with hostility.8).
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the hostKKant therefore approves of the closure by China and
Japan of their borders to predatory European trading companies.300 In contrast, a refugee cannot be turned away because
that would 9destroy the/%8 that is, leave the/ without a rightLul
condition.301 Within these li/its, persons have rights 9to try to
establish community with all and, to this end, to visit all regions
oL the earth,8 whiQh Qannot be annulled despite the possibility of
abuse.302 A state may not deny a visitor the chance simply to
9present oneselL Lor soQiety,8303 for this would amount to treating
her as an untouchable.
Thus described, cosmopolitan right clearly implies the provision and /aintenanQe oL international 9roads8 Lor all to travel
uponKthe seas and deserts.304 Contrary to Grotius, the high
seas are not irreducible to property or sovereignty because they
are by nature nonexcludable and nonrivalrous; in fact the whole
reason he wrote the Free Sea was to challenge the Portuguese
closure of sea lanes.305 Rather, it is because the seas are necessary for travel.306 Pirates and brigands threaten these global
thoroughfares, thereby rendering the fulfilment of cosmopolitan
right subject to their arbitrary will.307 As the fiduciaries of their
subjects, states accordingly have jurisdiction to punish pirates
and brigands as enemies of mankind.
The same rationale can be leveraged to justify the use of state
regulatory powers to address climate change. To wit, climate
change leaves 9peoples living in Qoastal regions threatened by
rising water levels, others threatened by ever-more-frequent
and violent storms, and yet others whose agricultural or hunter300. PP 8:359, at 329N30.
301. PP 8:358, at 329.
302. DR 6:353, at 489.
303. PP 8:358, at 329.
304. Id.
305. Wouter Werner, Mankind’s Territory and the Limits of International
Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF JAN
KLABBERS 103N118, 108 (Rain Liivoja & Jarna Petman eds., 2014). In any
event, we have definitely possessed the technology to mark off exclusive economic zones and to build artificial islands since the 1950s. See Scott J. Shackelford, The Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 28 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
109, 122N24 (2009).
306. DR 6:352-53, at 489 (9Although the seas might seem to remove nations
from any community with one another, they are the arrangements of nature
most favoring their commerce by means of navigation. . . .8).
307. PP 8:358, at 329.
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gatherer ways of life are threatened by diminishing rains and
other climactic changesZ8308 At best, these instances of property
damage may ground a claim for private nuisance on the part of
the affected private persons, assuming they can hale the distant
polluters into their courts, and overcome the insurmountable evidential obstacles. As against their national state, however, climate change-inducing activities constitute wrongs akin to public
nuisance because they leave its subjects systematically dependent upon the choices of distant polluters.309 With respect to private individuals, climate change at best constitutes property
damage. As against the state, however, it is injury. Given that
certain low-lying or island states may disappear completely as a
result of rising sea levels, climate change therefore threatens the
very existence of these states as moral persons.310
The state’s entitle/ent to redress suQh threats to its ani/at[
ing purpose against it is not altered by the fact that the polluter
is located outside the jurisdiction. As Kant argues, if a measure
is neQessary 9Lor its seQurity8Kthat is, to fulfill its sole purpose
of ensuring the equal freedom of its subjectsKthe state 9Qan and
ought to require the others to enter with it into a constitution
similar to a civil constitution, in which it can be assured of its
rightZ8311 The burdens placed upon other persons by such unilateral measures are never wrongful because the invitation to join
a rightful condition is an offer that cannot be refused. Or, as
Su// puts it, poliQy areas with 9potential Qross-border eLLeQts8
are 9areas in whiQh states lack legitimate authority to effectively
Qontrol what /ay or /ay not be done,8 suQh that:
308. Evan Fox-Decent, From Fiduciary States to Joint Trusteeship of the Atmosphere: The Right to a Healthy Environment through a Fiduciary Prism, in
FIDUCIARY DUTY AND THE ATMOSPHERIC TRUST 253, 259 (Ken Coghill, Charles
Sampford, & Tim Smith eds., 2013).
309. Id. at 259N60 (arguing that 9vulnerable peoples . . . are left to negotiate
as best they can with those who are indifferent to the effects of environmental
degradation. . . . The vulnerable are left to beg more powerful parties for compensation that is given as charity, if it is given at all. . . .8); id. at 264 (arguing
that Pacific 9islanders’ rights to their lands are 9illusory8 if the unilateral actions of other states are permitted to cause global warming and rising sea levels.8).
310. See e.g., Randall S. Abate, Public Nuisance Suits for the Climate Justice
Movement: The Right Thing and the Right Time, 85 WASH. L. REV 197, 210
(2010) (observing that 9Lohachara Island, in India’s part of the Sundarbans,
was the first inhabited island to be claimed by rising seas; this left 10,000 inhabitants homeless.8).
311. PP 8:354, at 326.

2017]

Unilateral Jurisdiction to Provide Public Goods

643

No injustice is done to states when they are subject to legal
obligations without having consented to them. On the contrary,
deep legitimacy questions arise when individual states have
the capacity to effectively veto the emergence of universally
binding obligations in contexts where the behavior of an individual state raises justice-sensitive externality concerns.312

A state that remains outside the rightful condition seeks to reserve for itself the ability to bend all others to its arbitrary will.
Other states need not, and should not, tolerate this if it is incompatible with their ability to provide their subjects with a rightful
condition. Alternatively, a state is unfree if it refuses to enter
the international rightful condition. It can thus legitimately be
forced, again, only insofar as this is necessary for other states to
guarantee their subjects a rightful condition.
In this light, we revisit the cases Benvenisti relies upon in support of his proposed obligation of costless accommodation. The
preQedent /ost Qongenial to "envenisti’s and ;yngaert’s e*uita[
ble approach is the Iron Rhine Arbitration, which concerned a
dispute between the Netherlands and Belgium regarding the reactivation of a disused railway line linking the two countries.313
In the complex treaty arrangements pursuant to which the railway line was built, a right of transit had been granted to Belgium over Dutch territory, subject to the Netherlands retaining
certain regulatory powers.314 One question before the tribunal
was whether a diversion proposed by the Netherlands for environmental reasons was compatible with the Belgian right of
transit.315 In its award, the tribunal held that Belgium could not
9reasonably withhold its Qonsent,8 espeQially iL the Retherlands
offered to bear the extra costs incurred as a result of the diversion.316 This QontradiQts "envenisti’s restriQted Pareto criterion,
under which states may not accept side payments in exchange
Lor aQQo//odating others’ interestsZ Un Right of Passage (Port.
v. Ind.), the ICJ found that Portugal had acquired rights of passage over Indian territory between its then Indian enclaves,
largely due to historical use rather than any deeper principle.317

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Kumm, supra note 80, at 251.
Iron Rhine, 27 R.I.A.A. ¶ 2.
See id. ¶¶ 28N43.
Id. ¶ 3.
Id. ¶ 232.
See Right of Passage (Port. v. Ind.), 1960 I.C.J. at 37N38.
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More importantly, consider Lake Lanoux, which involved a dispute between France and Spain concerning French plans to divert a shared river to construct a hydroelectric dam. The relevant treaty provided that any party seeking to carry out works
on the river had to obtain the approval of the other.318 France
proposed a hydroelectric project involving works wholly within
its territory and which would not have imposed any costs upon
Spain. Spain nevertheless denied its approval, probably in order
to ransom the French for a larger share of water and electricity.319 The crucial passages in the award state as follows:
To admit that jurisdiction in a certain field can no longer be
exercised except on the condition of, or by way of, an agreement
between two States, is to place an essential restriction on the
sovereignty of a State, and such restriction could only be admitted if there were clear and convincing evidence. Without doubt,
international practice does reveal some special cases in which
this hypothesis has become reality. . . . But these cases are exceptional, and international judicial decisions are slow to recognize their existence, especially when they impair the territorial sovereignty of a State, as would be the case in the present
matter.
In effect, in order to appreciate in its essence the necessity for
prior agreement, one must envisage the hypothesis in which
the interested States cannot reach agreement. In such a case,
it must be admitted that the State which is normally competent
has lost its right to act alone as a result of the unconditional
and arbitrary opposition of another State. This amounts to admitting a “right of assent”; a “right of veto”, which at the discretion of one State paralyses the exercise of the territorial jurisdiction of another.320

Clearly, these passages indicate that the legal analysis had
nothing to do with weighing or balancing of interests for the
maximization of utility, but everything to do with ensuring that
no sovereign is rendered subject to the will of another.
Finally, consider Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related
Rights, where the ICJ was required to construe a treaty between
Nicaragua and Costa Rica, under which Costa Rica had been
given navigational rights 9Lor the purposes oL Qo//erQe8 along
318. See Additional Act of May 26, 1866 to the Treaties of Bayonne (Dec. 1,
1856; Apr. 14, 1862; May 26, 1866).
319. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 323.
320. Lake Lanoux, 24 I.L.R. at 128 (emphasis added).
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a river demarcated as entirely within Nicaraguan territory. The
issue was whether certain villagers on the Costa Rican bank
Qould rely upon that eaQeption to /aHe use oL the river 9to /eet
the basic requirements of everyday life, such as taking children
to sQhool or Z Z Z givdingc or reQeivdingc /ediQal treat/entZ Z Z Z8321
The topography of the region was such that inland travel would
have been prohibitively expensive for those communities. The
U!T reLused to strain the word 9Qo//erQe8 to inQlude nonQo/[
mercial activity, holding instead that:
It cannot have been the intention of the authors of the [treaty]
to deprive the inhabitants of the Costa Rican Bank of the river,
of the right to use the river to the extent necessary to meet
their essential requirements, even for activities of a non-commercial nature, given the geography of the area. . . . [T]he parties must be presumed . . . to have intended to preserve for the
Costa Ricans living on that bank a minimal right of navigation
for the purposes of continuing to live a normal life in the villages along the river.322

Once again, the language is not about interests that can be
accommodated at no cost or of requests which Nicaragua could
not have refused in good conscience. Although Nicaragua never
argued it, its interests may very well have been harmed by increased river traffic. Instead, the decision clearly evokes the idea
of mandatory cooperation, to which consent cannot be refused.
The navigational rights simply had to be accorded by Nicaragua
because, otherwise, a community of Costa Ricans would have
been left as prisoners in their own homes.
As these precedents show, there is considerable support in existing legal practice for the conception of public goods advocated
in this article; that is, as things that must be provided publicly
in order to ensure the non-domination of all persons. These doctrinal materials also suggest the outline of a defense of unilateral measures asserting authority extraterritorially with a view
to providing global public goods for its subjects. This outline will
be fleshed out in the paragraphs that follow.
B. The Irrelevance of Harm
Closing a necessary passage is as internationally wrongful as
false imprisonment. Transboundary environmental pollution is
321. Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights, 2009 I.C.J. at 74.
322. Id. ¶ 79.
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internationally wrongful as a battery upon the body of the state.
"oth are wrongLul regardless oL da/ageZ LiHewise, a state’s
right to enact unilateral measures providing global public goods
is not contingent upon proof of harm.
The above characterization of transboundary pollution might
sound novel, given that international environmental law is
thought to be pre/ised upon a 9no-har/8 prinQiple obligating
states to ensure that their territories and resources are not used
in ways that cause damage to others above some threshold of
significance.323 Un this regard, it rese/bles the 7Z:Z 9eLLeQts doQ[
trine,8 whiQh dee/s it 9settled law Z Z Z that any :tate /ay i/pose
liabilities, even upon persons not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders
whiQh the :tate reprehendsZ Z Z Z8324 First enunciated in the Trail
Smelter arbitration,325 the no-harm principle has since been confirmed by subsequent international judicial decisions326 and en-

323. See, e.g., PHILIPPE SANDS & JACQUELINE PEEL, PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 190N200 (3d ed. 2012); Jutta Brunnée,
Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA PUB. INT’L L.
paras.
11,
12,
(Mar.
2010),
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1607
(last visited Jul 27, 2016).
324. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
325. Trail Smelter Arbitration (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1905, 1965 (1941)
(holding that 9under the principles of international law . . . no State has the
right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or persons
therein. . . .8).
326. See, e.g., Corfu Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), Judgment, 1949 I.C.J. 4, 22 (Apr.
9) (describing 9every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to
be used for acts contrary to the rights of other States8); Legality of the Threat
or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) 1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶ 29 (9The existence of the general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their
jurisdiction and control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of the corpus of international law relating to
the environment.8).
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shrined in numerous international instruments and pronouncements, such the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,327 the Rio Declaration,328 and the ILC Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm.329
Increasingly, however, environmental scholars and policymakers have begun to find the no-harm principle problematic, particularly in the subfield of climate law. Despite arguing for its
Qontinued relevanQe, "eno]t Mayer notes the 9Qounter-intuitive,
even surprising [fact] . . . that the no-harm principle has rarely
been explicitly invoked in international responses to climate
QhangeZ8330 The obvious reason is that requiring demonstrable
proof of environmental damage hamstrings the ability of regulators and policymakers to take preventative steps to protect the
environment. Jutta Brunnée cites practical difficulties of tracing
particular serious harms to particular emitters to conclude that
9dQcli/ate Qhange Z Z Z is not the Hind oL transboundary pollution
Qonte/plated by the no har/ ruleZ8331 International environmental lawyers have accordingly tweaked the 9no-har/8 rule to
i/ply two Qategories oL obligations: 9substantive8 and 9proQe[
duralZ8332 Substantive obligations are to refrain from causing actual transboundary da/age, while proQedural obligations are 9to
notify, warn, inform, or consult states potentially affected by
transboundary impacts, to undertake (transboundary) environ-

327. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
Swed., June 5N16, 1972, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Principle 21, U.N. Doc.A/Conf 48/14/Rev. 1 (Nov. 1973).
328. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development, Principle 2, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.151/5/Rev. 1
(1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration].
329. Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities, with commentaries, in Rep. of the Int’l Law Comm’n to the Gen.
Assembly, 53d sess., Article 3, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
(2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Transboundary Harm].
330. Benoît Mayer, The Relevance of the No-harm Principle to Climate
Change Law and Politics, 19 ASIA PACIFIC. J. ENVTL. L. 79, 79 (2016).
331. Jutta Brunnée, The Global Climate Regime: Wither Common Concern?,
in COEXISTENCE, COOPERATION AND SOLIDARITY: LIBER AMICORUM RÜDIGER
WOLFRUM, VOL. 1 721, 722 (Anja Seibert-Fohr et al. eds., 2011).
332. See e.g., ULRICH BEYERLIN & THILO MARAUHN, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 39N46 (2011); PIERRE-MARIE DUPUY & JORGE E.
VIÑUALES, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 54 (2015).
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mental impact assessments . . . and monitor or report perfor/anQe oL treaty Qo//it/ents as speQiLied by the treatyZ8333 The
same idea of avoiding risks instead of harm also animates the
precautionary principle, under which hazardous activities are
prohibited, even in the absence of full certainty about the risk.334
The supposed distinction between substantive and procedural
obligations under the 9no-har/8 prinQiple was disQussed in the
Pulp Mills case, where the ICJ was tasked with construing a
treaty between Argentina and Uruguay pertaining to the River
Uruguay.335 Un interpreting the 9proQedural8 aspeQts oL the
treaty, the court took cognizance of the customary obligation of
due diligence, which it found had evolved to contain a require/ent 9to undertaHe an environ/ental i/paQt assess/ent where
there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a
significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particular, on a shared resourQeZ8336 The court held that a violation of
a procedural obligation under the treaty did not necessarily imply a violation of a substantive obligation as well,337 and contrariwise that 9the LaQt that the parties d/ayc have Qo/plied with
their substantive obligations does not mean that they are

333. Jutta Brunnée, International Environmental Law and Community Interests: Procedural Aspects, in COMMUNITY OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW,
3 (Eyal Benvenisti & Georg Nolte eds., forthcoming 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2784701 (last visited Jan 11, 2017).
334. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 7, U.N. GAOR, 37th Sess., Annex,
Agenda Item 21, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (1982) (when 9potential adverse
effects are not fully understood, the activities should not proceed8); Rio Declaration, princ. 15 (9In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation.8).
335. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), 2010 I.C.J. 14 (Apr. 20).
Id. ¶ 204. See also id. ¶ 101 (9[T]he principle of prevention, as a customary rule,
has its origins in the due diligence that is required of a State in its territory. It
is 6every State’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for
acts contrary to the rights of other States.’ . . . A State is thus obliged to use all
the means at its disposal in order to avoid activities which take place in its
territory, or in any area under its jurisdiction, causing significant damage to
the environment of another State.8) (internal citations omitted).
337. Id. ¶¶ 71N74.
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deemed to have complied ipso facto with their procedural obligations, or are eaQused Lro/ doing soZ8338 The procedural/substantive divide was pursued further between Costa Rica and Nicaragua in the Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the
Border Area litigation, where one of the issues raised was
whether Nicaragua had procedural obligations to conduct an environmental impact assessment and to notify Costa Rica of its
results before commencing dredging on a boundary river. The
court held that it did not, on grounds that the dredging did not
pose a sufficiently significant environmental risk.339
In her separate opinion in that case, Judge Donoghue stated
that she found the strategy of distinguishing between procedural
and substantive obligations unhelpful, and that she preferred
instead to reQogni`e a 9re*uire/ent to eaerQise due diligenQe8 as
the single 9governing pri/ary nor/ Z Z Z that applies to all phases
of a project (e.g., planning, assessment of impact, decision to proceed, implementation, post-i/ple/entation /onitoring^Z8340 On
her approach, a failure to exercise due diligence in the planning
phase Qould 9engage the responsibility oL the :tate oL origin even
in the absence of material damage to potentially affected
:tatesZ8 Moreover,
[i]f, at a subsequent phase, the failure of the State of origin to
exercise due diligence in the implementation of a project causes
significant transboundary harm, the primary norm that is
breached remains one of due diligence, but the reparations due
to the affected State must also address the material damage
caused to the affected State.341

Judge Donoghue is correct. To recall, if you and your friends
played football in the middle of a highway, you would all be liable in public nuisance, even if, miraculously, you did not disrupt
any traffic. Few would say that this was because despite not
Qausing any 9substantive8 traLLiQ disruption, you nonetheless
/ade 9proQedural8 nuisanQes oL yourselvesZ Unstead, the only

338. Id. ¶ 78.
339. Certain Activities carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa
Rica v. Nicar.) and Construction of a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan
River (Nicar. v. Costa Rica), 2015 I.C.J. 665, ¶¶ 101N12 (Dec. 16) [hereinafter
Certain Activities Carried Out By Nicaragua].
340. Certain Activities Carried Out By Nicaragua, supra note 339 (separate
opinion of Judge Donoghue), ¶ 9.
341. Id.
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question they would asH is: 9What iL everybody did that$8342 In
cases involving public or common goods, potential damage is secondary. The notion of procedural and substantive obligations under the 9no-har/8 prinQiple is si/ply an atte/pt to shoehorn
what is really an injury into the language of damage. There is
only one obligationKa substantive obligation to exercise due diligence.
Interest-based accounts that place harms front and center also
have tremendous difficulty accounting for the precautionary
principle because it is impossible to weigh the unknown harms
and benefits of proposed hazardous conduct against the cost of
regulation. As Cass Sunstein argued in a series of articles and
books, potential harms and benefits fall on both sides of the
sQale, suQh that any 9balanQing8 or 9weighing8 oL presently un[
quantifiable interests is logically impossible.343 Instead, Sunstein argues that invocations of the precautionary principle usually reflect little more than cognitive and cultural biases.344 Societies also differ greatly in the harms they revile, such that prioritizations of particular interests, say, in a clean environment,
may be attacked as reflecting prejudices, or worse, illicit biases
in favor of particular lobbies.345 Benvenisti remarks in this vein
that that the precautionary principle is inherently conservative
beQause it 9Qonveys the potentially erroneous /essage that pre[
sent uses are a priori saLeZ8346 Sunstein goes even further, arguing that the ultimate result of the precautionary principle is poliQy paralysis: 9[I]t stands as an obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and to everything in betweenZ8347

342. RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 262.
343. Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV.
1003 (2003) [Beyond the Precautionary Principle] (arguing that the precautionary principle is unworkable because 9risks are on all sides of social situations.
Any effort to be universally precautionary will be paralyzing, forbidding every
imaginable step, including no step at all.8). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841 (2005); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (2005).
344. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, supra note 343, at 1035N
54.
345. Id. at 1015N16 (discussing how the precautionary principle features in
some areas of EU regulation but not others).
346. EYAL BENVENISTI, SHARING TRANSBOUNDARY RESOURCES: INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND OPTIMAL RESOURCE USE 110N11 (2002).
347. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, supra note 343, at 1028.
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This conundrum is avoided if one conceives of the purpose of
law as guaranteeing freedom from domination, rather than the
maximization of utility. As Evan Fox-feQent notes, the 9relianQe
on Sant’s legal theory allows it to trade LruitLully on the Santian
distinQtion between har/s and wrongs8 in eapliQating legal so[
lutions to proble/s liHe Qli/ate Qhange that are 9gradual and
non-linear in progression, severely affecting at present a relatively s/all portion oL the earth’s populationZ8348 The transfer of
the burden of proof under the precautionary principle may be
justified in the same way as the burden of proof in defamation.
"eing a Lree e*ual i/plies a right to be 9beyond reproaQh,8 that
is, never being required to clear your own name.349 At common
law, a plaintiff in a libel action never has to demonstrate that
she has suffered or will suffer damage as a result of an insulting
statement.350 Instead, it is for the defendant to establish its
truth, or to withdraw it.351 If the burdens were otherwise, everyone would have to spend their lives putting out every small fire
started by others, rendering them effectively subject to everyone
else’s arbitrary QhoiQesZ The sa/e strategy JustiLies the prohibi[
tion of conduct that is strongly suspected but not proven to be
harmful under the precautionary principle. The state can legitimately expect a party proposing prima facie harmful activity to
prove its harmlessness if such activity presents a risk of leaving
its subjects at the mercy of distant polluters.352 This is not just a
348. Fox-Decent, supra note 308, at 260.
349. DR 6:238, at 394; RIPSTEIN, Force and Freedom, supra note 13, at 50N
51.
350. Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd. (1966) 117 C.L.R. 118, 150 (Austl.)
(Windeyer J.) (holding that a plaintiff 9gets damages because he was injured
in his reputation, that is simply because he was publically defamed.8); Jameel
v. The Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, [2007] 1 App. Cas.
359, ¶ 91 (appeal taken from Eng.) (Lord Hoffmann) (holding that because a
man’s 9reputation is a part of his personality, the 6immortal part’ of himself,8
9it is right that he should be entitled to vindicate his reputation and receive
compensation for a slur upon it without proof of financial loss.8).
351. Belt v. Lawes (1882) L.J.Q.B. 359, 361 (Eng.). This remains the position
in almost the entire English-speaking world except the United States. See Hill
v. Church of Scientology of Toronto [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130 (Can.); Khumalo v.
Holomisa 2002 (5) SA 401 (CC) (S. Afr.); The Age Co. Ltd. v. Elliott (2006) 14
V.R. 375 (Austl.).
352. See Singapore Transboundary Haze Pollution Act, No. 24 (2014), supra
note 6 at §8(2) (9[W]hereK(a) it is proved, or presumed by the operation [the
act], that an entity owns or occupies any land situated outside Singapore; and
(b) it is further proved, or presumed by operation of [the act], that any haze
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QolleQtive interest or Qo//on 9QonQern,8 but also an individual
right belonging to the state.
The jurisprudence of the CJEU is a particularly rich source of
precedent regarding the merely secondary nature of harms with
respect to unilateral jurisdiction to provide global public goods.
Unlike courts in the United States, the CJEU has never invoked
the effects doctrine to ground jurisdiction over extraterritorial
mergers and cartels. The leading case is Wood Pulp I, which involved an international cartel coordinating the prices of wood
pulp being sold into the European Union.353 As is the custom of
that court, the judgment was preceded by an advisory opinion by
Advocate General Darmon, who recommended the adoption of
the effects doctrine.354 The eventual judgment ignored this adviQe and held si/ply that the 9deQisive LaQtor8 grounding the
Qourt’s JurisdiQtion to regulate the Qartel was the LaQt that the
antiQo/petitive agree/ent was 9i/ple/ented8 in the European
Union.355 The CJEU has reaffirmed this stance numerous times,
most recently in Air Transport Association of America, where
Advocate General Kokott recommended in her advisory opinion
that the Emissions Trading Directive be upheld on the basis of
the effects of carbon emissions on the EU territory; that is, on a
theory of harms.356 The CJEU once again rejected this advice,
Linding instead that the European 7nion’s Qo/petenQe to i/pose
suQh Lees Lollowed si/ply Lro/ the 9environ/ental proteQtion ob[
jectives which it has set for itself, in particular where those objectives follow on from an international agreement [the Kyoto
ProtoQolc to whiQh the European 7nion is a signatoryZ Z Z Z8357
Liberal, harm-based theories face tremendous difficulties in
accounting for environmental law, which are avoided on the republican, freedom-based model. Moreover, there is considerable
pollution in Singapore involves smoke resulting from any fire on that land outside Singapore, it shall be presumed, until the contrary is proved, that the entity which is the owner or occupier of the land engaged in conduct, or engaged
in conduct that condones any conduct by another, which caused or contributed
to that haze pollution in Singapore.8).
353. Joined Cases 89/85, 104/85, 114/85, 116/85, 117/85 & 125/85 to 129/85,
Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and Others v. Comm’n (Wood Pulp I), 1988 E.C.R. 5193.
354. Opinion of Advocate General Darmon, Wood Pulp I, 1988.E.C.R. 5214,
¶¶ 57N58.
355. Wood Pulp I, 1988 E.C.R. ¶ 16. See generally id. ¶¶ 11N18.
356. Opinion of Advocate General Kokott, Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America, 2011 E.C.R. I-13833, ¶ 154.
357. Case C-366/10, Air Transport Association of America, 2011 E.C.R. ¶ 128.
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doctrinal support for treating questions of damage as secondary,
or even irrelevant, in assessing the legality of extraterritorial
measures purporting to provide global public goods, such as competition regulation and environmental protection. Without damage or imminence thereof having to be proved, however, there is
the concern that assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction may
become untethered to any limiting principle.
C. Public Purpose and Necessity
# state’s Qo/petenQe to enaQt eatraterritorial /easures arises
not from an obligation to advance welfare generally, nor even
because its interests are harmed, but only if its freedom is undermined. In his discussion of cosmopolitan right, Kant reserves
special venom for those justifying the use of force against indigenous peoples /erely on the basis that thereby 9these Qrude peo[
ples will beQo/e Qivili`ed,8 arguing instead that 9all these sup[
posed good intentions cannot wash away the stain of injustice in
the /eans used Lor the/Z8358 Moreover, extraterritorial jurisdiction is not JustiLied iL 9neither nature nor QhanQe8 has brought a
state into QontaQt with 9a people that holds out no prospeQt oL
Qivil union with itZ Z Z Z8359
The same criteria governing the domestic provision of public
goods also apply at the international level. Any unilateral measure must be necessary Lor the state’s sole public purpose of securing the equal freedom of its subjects. It can neither pursue a
private conception of the good reflecting the common sympathies
peQuliar to a partiQular Qo//unity, nor even a 9global value8
shared by every single state in the world. Even if such a thing
existed, coercion is never justified merely because it does another good. The secret intruder would wrong you if he threw
away your cigarettes and poured your whisky down the sink,
even if you fully and sincerely agreed that drinking and smoking
were bad for you. This means, however, that unlike in the domestic rightful condition, a state may not enact extraterritorial
measures to pursue aims that are compatible with, but not necessary for, a domestic rightful condition. Cagliostro may not impose taxes upon the citizens of Ruritania to set up a national
opera house there, even if Ruritanians could really do with a bit

358. DR 6:353, at 490.
359. DR 6:266, at 417.
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of culture. Such a decision requires Ruritanian democratic approval, which Cagliostro does not possess.
Neither may Cagliostro enact measures that pursue proper
public purposes, but which impose greater burdens on Ruritanians than are strictly needed. Anything in excess can only be for
a private purpose. For this reason, unilateral assertions of extraterritorial JurisdiQtion /ay have to be 9Lleaible,8 or sensitive
to Qhanges in other states’ regulatory regi/esZ360 An example is
the EU Emissions Trading Directive, which provides that:
If a third country adopts measures, which have an environmental effect at least equivalent to that of this Directive, to reduce
the climate impact of flights to the Community, the Commission should consider the options available in order to provide
for optimal interaction between the Community scheme and
that Qountry’s /easures, aLter Qonsulting with that QountryZ361

For such reasons, it may be necessary to invite the participation of foreign stakeholders in domestic policymaking processes.
Benvenisti and Ryngaert are therefore correct to advocate these
things, even though they do so for different reasons.362 If the
measure meets these criteria, other states will be under an obligation of mandatory QooperationZ 9"loQHing statutes,8 suQh as
that which the United States enacted to prohibit U.S. airlines
from complying with the EU emissions trading scheme, will be
illegal.363
Aside from the above substantive criteria, there is one institutional requirement that must be fulfilled: the judicial settlement
of disputes. As argued above, the one defect in an international
state of nature is the indeterminacy of rights, meaning that the
one institutional requirement of the international rightful condition is an international court where states may settle their disputes through lawsuits rather than by war. Therefore, a state
purporting to provide a global public good unilaterally must submit itself to the jurisdiction of an international court for the purpose of addressing any legal challenges regarding necessity or
public purpose, because claims of right remain indeterminate in
360. Benvenisti, Legislating for Humanity, supra note 45, at 13.
361. EU Emissions Trading Directive, supra note 4, at Recital 17.
362. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 329N32; RYNGAERT,
Unilateral Jurisdiction, supra note 59, at 109N40.
363. European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, 49
U.S.C. §40101 (2012).
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the absence of a nonpartisan adjudicator. No state can simply
expect others to accept its professions of good faith.364 Of course,
compulsory general jurisdiction does not exist in international
law as it currently stands. Nothing, however, prevents a state
from accepting the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, or of other courts or arbitral tribunals. If states avail themselves of this facility, there will be no reason to question the legitimacy of their unilateral measures in pursuit of global public
goods.
D. Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations
When a political institution asserts authority over distant
strangers in the course of providing public goods, it acquires fiduciary obligations to them in human rights. Because human
rights are principles of public fiduciary law, the sole criterion for
the possession of human rights obligations is authority, rather
than control, or the factual ability to affect the material wellbeing of persons. This is evident from Ilaşcu, where the Strasbourg Court held that Moldova was obligated to use all diplomatic, economic, judicial, and other means within its ability to
secure the rights of individuals held in a breakaway region over
which it had no physical control but nevertheless claimed authority.365 A similar position was articulated in Pueblo Bello
Massacre, where the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
held Colombia accountable for atrocities committed by paramilitaries in a region where it had only tenuous control.366 These
decisions will seem incomprehensible on a theory of the human
rights practice where state obligations track physical control
over land and persons, or the ability to affect the welfare of individuals.367 They make sense, however, on a concept of human
rights as public fiduciary law. A state holding itself out as the

364. Benvenisti, Sovereign Trusteeship, supra note 15, at 317N18 (rejecting
the claim that sovereigns may be allowed to abide by their own judgment without giving others any reasons, but stopping short of requiring compulsory judicial settlement of disputes).
365. Ula(Qu vZ Moldova and ;ussia, #ppZ RoZ C?@?@Y>>, EurZ !tZ HZ;Z EXXCVII, ¶¶ 332N52.
366. Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶¶ 105N40 (Jan. 31, 2006).
367. MILANOVIC, supra note 71, at 106-07.
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public fiduciary of a group of people must be held to those standards, regardless of its actual ability to play this role.368 These are
obligations of conduct, not result. A state may be excused if it
cannot fulfil its obligations, but it bears the burden of proving it
tried.
As it happens, there is an example from Strasbourg where extraterritorial human rights jurisdiction arose as a result of unilateral measures taken for the provision of a public good: the
preservation of the monetary system. Like roads, money is necessary for intercourse between persons: in the Doctrine of Right,
Kant specifies the 9real deLinition8 oL /oney as 9the universal
means by which men exchange their industriousness with one anotherZ8369 A full explanation of how money constitutes a public
good is beyond the scope of this article, but the sense is captured
by the following quote by Ann Pettifor:
The i/paQt oL the LinanQial seQtor’s power-grab for our monetary system can only be fully grasped if we compare it to a
power-grab for the public sanitation system. Were the sanitation system to be captured in the same way, we would live in a
world in which a small elite abused a great public good. . . .
That is effectively what has happened in economic terms since
the finance sector made a power-grab for the money system in
the late F>AXs and 6@XsZ370

Kovačić v. Slovenia was brought by Croatian applicants who
had been prevented by Slovenian legislation from withdrawing
their foreign currency deposits held at a Zagreb branch of a Slovenian banH _9LJublJana "anH8^Z371 The accounts had been

368. See Dyson, supra note 193, at 20 (arguing, with respect to the ECHR,
that 9[i]f a Contracting State has taken over control of the civil administration
of the foreign territory then its inability to control the situation is not a ticket
out of the Convention.8).
369. DR 6:287, at 435. The 9real8 definition is contrasted against a 9nominal
definition8 of money as a 9thing that can be used only by being alienated,8
where such alienation 9is intended not as a gift but for reciprocal acquisition
(by a pactum onerosum).8 DR 6:286, at 434.
370. ANN PETTIFOR, THE PRODUCTION OF MONEY: HOW TO BREAK THE POWER
OF BANKERS 70 (2017). See id. at 15 (arguing that 9sound banking and monetary systemsKjust as sanitation, clean air and waterKcan be a great 9public
good.8).
371. Sova&i' vZ :lovenia, _#s/issibility feQision^ #ppZ RosZ CCB@CY>?,
45133/98 and 48316/99, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Apr. 1, 2004), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-23835.
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opened with the Ljubljana Bank prior to the breakup of Yugoslavia and had been guaranteed by the National Bank of Yugoslavia. Beginning in 1988, the accounts were steadily frozen in
order to stem hyperinflation. Following the breakup, newly independent Slovenia legislated to require the Ljubljana Bank to
maintain this freeze with respect to all such foreign currency accounts, including those held in branches outside Slovenia.372
Notwithstanding the then-recent Banković decision, a chamber of the court held unanimously that the matter fell within
:lovenia’s hu/an rights JurisdiQtion beQause 9the aQts oL the :lo[
venian authorities continue[d] to produce effects, albeit outside
:lovenian territory, suQh that :lovenia’s responsibility under
the !onvention Qould be engagedZ8373 Despite some confusion in
the Qourt’s language, it was never Qlai/ed by the appliQants or
by the court that the Ljubljana Bank was either controlled by or
acting upon the instruction of Slovenia, such that the freezing of
the accounts was somehow an act of the Slovenian state. Instead, the QruQial LaQtor was that :lovenian legislation had 9ad[
dress[ed]8 the operation oL banH aQQounts in !roatia, thus eaer[
cising political authority there.374 Undeed, the appliQants’ Qo/[
plaint asserted that 9Slovenia had chosen to interfere in the
Ljubljana banH’s private-law relationship to the detriment of
non-Slovenian savers.8375 These were legal effectsKthe results
of authority, not mere power. The Croatian applicants were legally barred from reclaiming their funds exactly as if those
measures had been legislated by Croatia. Slovenia therefore
bore human rights obligations toward the Croatian applicants,
including positive obligations to protect their rights from violation by a third party, the Ljubljana Bank.
Authority may be wielded legitimately only in a fiduciary capacity. If a state asserts extraterritorial jurisdiction over distant
strangers in order to provide public goods for its subjects/beneficiaries, those distant strangers also become its subjects/benefiQiariesZ #s their 9QonstruQtive8 LiduQiary, it has obligations toward them in human rights.

372.
373.
374.
375.

The facts are summarized at id. ¶ 1.
Id. ¶ 5(c).
Id.
Id. ¶ 5(b).
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CONCLUSION
Human dignity lies not in happiness but in being treated as a
person, rather than as a thing at the mercy of others. The only
way this can be achieved is through a set of political institutions,
which together form a person called the state, whose sole purpose is to ensure its subJeQts’ dignityZ The state thus has both
obligations and rights to provide public goods, which are necessary to ensure that no subject is left at the mercy of anybody
elseZ The state’s sole purpose Qannot be Lrustrated by the arbi[
trary noncooperation of other persons, state or nonstate, domestic or foreign. All others must mandatorily cooperate with it in
order to fulfill this single purpose. In enforcing such cooperation
unilaterally, the state need not demonstrate damage because it
has no property that can be damaged. The state must subject
itself to the jurisdiction of an international court in order to answer legal challenges regarding the necessity and proper purpose of unilateral measures. Finally, the state will acquire fiduciary obligations in human rights to distant strangers to the extent it asserts authority over them in the course of providing a
global public good.
And so, despite its very different premises, this article ends by
agreeing with Benvenisti both at its beginning and conclusion.
Just as for Benvenisti, the germ of this article lies in a belief in
the vital necessity of states as political institutions and of their
fiduciary office, as well as a conviction that the vast majority of
human beings alive today have no control over their lives because their political communities are Bantustans independent
only in name. It too culminates in the possibility of sovereigns
bearing fiduciary obligations toward distant strangers. Whereas
"envenisti’s /odel QonQeives oL sovereigns as direQtly owing Li[
duciary obligations to humanity, this article instead argues that
sovereigns owe fiduciary obligations first and foremost only to
their subjects, but that in the course of fulfilling these obligations, they constructively make themselves fiduciaries of the
rest of humanity. Finally, this article does not deny the importance of identity, values, and wellbeing, be it of individuals
or communities. It insists, however, that these things are too
complex to be achieved using the blunt implements of the law,
and that the best that law can do is to ensure equal freedom for
everyone, everywhere. Once individuals and states have been assured of this freedom, what they choose to do with it is their sovereign decision entirely.

